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Commercial Norms, Commercial
Codes, and International Commercial
Arbitration
ChristopherR. Drahoza
ABSTRACT
This Article examines whether the incorporation of
commercial norms into commercial codes is an appropriate
law-making strategy. Most commercial codes, including the
Uniform Commercial Code, regard common businesspractices
as an importantsource for courts to consider when resolving
contract disputes. Yet some scholars criticize this
incorporation strategy, arguing that reliance on commercial
norms is often inappropriateand may distort the true nature
of the parties' agreement. Reliance on commercial norms
does restrict the ability of contractingparties to allocate part
of their agreement to extra-legal means of enforcement.
Nevertheless, this Article asserts that those costs may be
outweighed by the benefits of incorporatingcommercial norms
into commercial codes.
The Article looks to internationalcommercial arbitration
as a source of evidence for evaluating the appropriaterole of
commercial norms in resolving contract disputes.
This
evidence is helpful to answering the question whether the
costs of relying on commercial norms outweigh the benefits
because international arbitration is consensual, resembles
adjudication in public courts in important ways, and is a
highly competitive business. The authorfinds that, generally,
international commercial arbitration relies on commercial
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norms to resolve such contract disputes. Although the
evidence presented is not conclusive, it does suggest that the
benefits of reliance on trade usages (but not prior dealings
between the parties)exceed the costs from any distortion of
the parties'agreement.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Modem commercial codes treat common business
practices-as reflected in usages of the trade as a whole and in
the prior dealings of the parties to the contract-as an important
source to which courts can turn in resolving disputes about the
parties' obligations under their agreement. Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides that usages of trade,
courses of dealing, and courses of performance "give particular
meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement."1
The rationale of the drafters of Article 2 was that such norms of
commercial behavior are an important source of rules governing
the parties' behavior and that a commercial code should
incorporate those norms when available. 2 The Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) similarly
provides that the "parties are bound by any usage to which they
have agreed and by any practices which they have established
between themselves," including any "usage of which the parties
knew or ought to have known and which in international trade is
widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts
3
of the type involved in the particular trade concerned."
Whether incorporation of commercial norms into commercial
codes is an appropriate law-making strategy has become the
subject of much scholarly debate. 4 Criticizing the incorporation

1.
U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (1995); see also id. § 2-208.
2.
By norms, I mean 'informal social regularities that individuals feel
obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of
external non-legal sanctions, or both.'
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338, 340 (1997). See also
Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 377, n.1 (1997) (using "norm" to mean 'common pattern of commercial
behavior'). For examples of the growing literature on norms and the law, see
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991); Symposium, The Nature and Sources, Formal and Informal, of Law, 82
CORNELL L. REv. 947 (1997); Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the
Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998); Symposium, Law and
Society & Law and Economics: Common Ground, Irreconcilable Differences, New
Directions, 1997 WiS. L. REv. 375; Symposium, Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996); Robert D. Cooter, StructuralAdjudication and the New Law
Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 215 (1994);
Kraus, supra; McAdams, supra; Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An
Economic Approach, 87 Am. ECON. REv. 365 (1997).
3.
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, art. 9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1981) [hereinafter CISG].
4.
See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking
the Code's Searchfor Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law]; Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, in
3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAw 108 (Peter Newman
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strategy is Professor Lisa Bernstein, who argues that commercial
norms may reflect practices that seek to preserve the relationship
of the parties ("relationship-preserving norms") rather than the
norms the parties themselves would choose when their
relationship essentially is at an end ("end-game norms").5 The
costs from such an inappropriate reliance on commercial norms,
Bernstein argues, may outweigh the informational value of norms
to generalist judges in understanding the parties' agreement. She
finds evidence in support of her thesis in the treatment of trade
usages and parties' dealings by arbitrators resolving disputes
under the auspices of the National Grain and Feed Association
(NGFA). NGFA arbitrators, Bernstein concludes, use a much
more formalistic approach to resolving contract disputes than do
judges applying modem commercial laws. This more formalistic
approach gives clear precedence to the parties' contract terms
and to the trade rules of the association over uncodified trade
practices and dealings of the parties. 6 Bernstein acknowledges,
however, that there may be "certain aspects of grain and feed
transactions and the institutional environment created by NGFA
that make a formalistic adjudicative approach particularly well7
suited" to that setting.
This article offers an empirical rejoinder to Professor
It looks to international commercial
Bernstein's criticism.
arbitration, rather than trade association arbitration, as a source
of evidence for evaluating the appropriate role of commercial
norms in resolving contract disputes. International commercial
arbitration provides a useful setting for such an examination for
several reasons. First, international commercial arbitration is
consensual. The parties initially must agree to arbitrate at all;
they must also agree on any institutional rules to apply, the
method by which arbitrators are chosen, and the situs of the
arbitration. When parties agree to arbitrate using certain rules,

ed., 1998) [hereinafter Bernstein, Private Commercial Law]; Lisa Bernstein, The
Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Prelimina
Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999) [hereinafter Bernstein, QuestionableEmpirical
Basis]; Richard CrasweU, Do Trade Customs Exist?, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW (Jody Kraus & Steven Walt eds.,

forthcoming 2000); Clayton P. Gillette, Harmony and Stasis in Trade Usages for
International Sales, 39 VA. J. INTL L. 707 (1999); Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt,
In Defense of the Incorporation Strategy, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW (Jody Kraus & Steven Walt eds., forthcoming

2000) [hereinafter Kraus & Walt]; Kraus, supra note 2; see also Symposium,
Formalism Revisited, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1999) (especially the papers on
"Formalism in Commercial Law").
Bernstein, MerchantLaw, supra note 4, at 1796-1802.
5.
6.
See id. at 1775-82.
7.
Id. at 1815.
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with particular arbitrators, and at particular sites, presumably it
is because such dispute resolution makes them better off than
they would be using alternative arrangements.
Second,
international commercial arbitration is a highly competitive
business.
Arbitral institutions, such as the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), compete with each other for the
administrative fees paid by parties who arbitrate under their
auspices. Countries compete to be the arbitral situs chosen by
the parties and reap the economic benefits that result from such
a choice. Arbitrators compete to be selected by the parties to
resolve their disputes.
This competition is facilitated by
international lawyers who select those rules, laws, and arbitrators
that ex ante benefit their clients. Third, international commercial
arbitration is more like court adjudication than is the NGFA
arbitration studied by Professor Bernstein. For example, the
decisionmakers in international arbitration hearings are likely to
be more like the generalist judges in national courts than are the
specialist arbitrators in trade association arbitrations.
The
informational value of trade usages and parties' dealings will
likely be higher to these generalists, who, while experienced in
deciding international disputes, may not be experts in the
particular industry involved.
Examining international arbitration rules and awards reveals
an approach to trade usage more like the approach taken by the
drafters of the UCC and the CISG than the formalistic approach
of the NGFA arbitrators. The Arbitration Rules of the ICC, for
example, provide that "[i]n all cases the Arbitral Tribunal shall
take account of the provisions of the contract and the relevant
trade usages. " s The rules of many leading international arbitral
institutions are similar. 9 The institutional rules do not, however,
direct the arbitrators to consider in a like manner the parties'
prior dealings.
Similarly, international arbitration statutes,
which are a product of interjurisdictional competition for
arbitration business, increasingly require arbitrators to consider
trade usages, although not course of dealing or course of
performance, when resolving disputes.
Finally, arbitration
awards rely on trade usages and considerations of good faith.
Indeed, the awards rely on good faith to such an extent that a
number of commentators have identified a duty of good faith in
contract performance as a central principle of international
contract law reflected in international arbitration awards. 1 0 The

8.

RULES OF ARBITRATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE art.

17(2) (1998).
9.
10.

See infra notes 161-84 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
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evidence again is far less strong for prior dealings between the
parties.
In sum, the general approach taken in international
commercial arbitration is to rely on commercial norms-at least
as reflected in trade usages-to resolve contract disputes. This
evidence, while far from conclusive, suggests that when contract
disputes are resolved by generalist judges (or arbitrators), the
informational benefits of relying on trade usages (although
apparently not prior dealings between the parties) exceed the
costs identified by Bernstein. Thus, the evidence presented here
supports the incorporation strategy followed by the UCC and the
CISG as to trade usages, but the evidence does not support the
incorporation strategy as to prior dealings between the parties.

II. COMMERCIAL NORMs AND CONTRACT DISPUTES
A. IncorporatingCommercialNorms into CommercialLaw
Modern commercial codes require judges to rely on norms of
commercial behavior in at least two ways in resolving contract
disputes.
First, codes expressly provide that the parties'
agreement includes relevant usages of trade, courses of dealing,
and courses of performance. 1
Under such code provisions,
judges look directly to what is customary in the trade or between
the parties in adjudicating any dispute. 12 Second, codes impose
general requirements of good faith, reasonableness, and the
like. 13 To determine whether a party has acted in good faith or
reasonably, commercial codes direct judges to look at commercial
norms as a baseline. 14 Drafters of commercial codes explain
their reliance on commercial norms as an attempt to bring
commercial law more in line with commercial practice.
As
explained by the drafters of the UCC, "the practices of
businessmen and business houses are important factors in
construing their contracts and actions and in determining their
rights and liabilities ....
[M]any of the changes effected by the
Code are designed to adapt rules of law to the way that business
is actually carried on."1 5
The following two sections briefly describe how the UCC and
the CISG incorporate commercial norms into commercial law.16

11.
See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-208.
12.
See id. § 1-205 cmt. 1.
13.
See, e.g., id. § 1-203 and cmt.
14.
See id.
15.
Walter D. Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code, 6 BuS. LAw. 113,
126 (1951) (quoting Report of the Committee on the Proposed Commercial Code).
16.
For descriptions of how other national laws deal with trade customs
and usages, see FILIP DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINEss LAW AND LEX MERCATORIA 135-
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1. Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
Article 2 of the UCC has been adopted by all of the fifty states
except Louisiana. It applies to "transactions in goods." 17 The
UCC distinguishes between usage of trade, course of dealing, and
course of performance, all of which can reflect commercial norms.
A "usage of trade" is "any practice or method of dealing having
such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to
justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the
transaction in question."18 A "course of dealing" is "a sequence of
previous conduct between the parties to a particular transaction
which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of
understanding for interpreting their expressions and other
conduct." 19 In other words, "course of dealing" is how the parties
dealt with each other under previous contracts. A "course of
performance" is how the parties dealt with each other under the
present contract; it requires that a contract "involve[] repeated
occasions for performance by either party with knowledge of the
nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it by
the other" and that the other "accept[] or acquiesce[] in [the
20
performance] without objection."
The UCC provides that a course of dealing or a "usage of
trade in the vocation or trade in which [the parties] are engaged
or of which they are or should be aware give particular meaning
21
to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement."
Similarly, a course of performance by the parties "shall be
relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement." 2 2 Indeed,
the UCC defines the parties' agreement to include not only "the
bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language" but also
their bargain "by implication" as found in "other circumstances
including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance." 23 The existence of a complete written contract does
not preclude a usage of trade, course of dealing, or course of

58 (1992); CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF, INTERNATIONAL TRADE USAGES 9-24 (Institute of
Intl Business Law and Practice Newsletter, International Chamber of Commerce,
1987).
17.
U.C.C. § 2-102.
18.
Id. § 1-205(2).
19.
Id. § 1-205(1).

20.

Id. § 2-208(1).

21.
Id. § 1-205(3). For economic analyses of the UCC provision, see
Elizabeth Warren, Trade Usage and Partiesin the Trade: An Economic Rationalefor
an Inflexible Rule, 42 U. PIrr. L. REv. 515 (1981); Jim C. Chen, Code, Custom, and
Contract: The Uniform Commercial Code as Law Merchant, 27 TEX. INTL L.J. 91,
123-26 (1992).
22.
U.C.C. § 2-208(l).
23.
Id. § 1-201(3).
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performance from explaining or supplementing the parties'
writing.2 4 When there is a conflict between the terms of the
written contract and these other sources of contract terms, the
court is directed to construe them to avoid the conflict. 2 5 If it
cannot do so, the express terms prevail. 2 6 The Official Comments
to Article 2, however, indicate that "the course of prior dealings
between the parties and the usages of trade" have to be "carefully
negated" by the contracting parties; otherwise, they have become
"an element of the meaning of the words used."27
Other provisions of the UCC permit or require courts to
examine commercial practices in resolving contract disputes.
Section 1-203 provides that "[e]very contract or duty within this
Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or
enforcement"; 28 "good faith" is defined for "merchants" 2 9 as
"honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade."3 0 In addition, a party's
course of performance can result in "waiver or modification of any
term inconsistent with such course of performance." 3 ' Professor
Bernstein concludes that, despite the priority formally given by
the UCC to the terms of the contract, "[iun practice,... courts, in
a variety of doctrinal guises that are either explicitly or implicitly
authorized by the Code, often allow these considerations to vary
32
or trump the express terms of a written contract."

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id. § 2-202(a).
See id. §§ 1-205(4), 2-208(2).
See id. §§ 1-205(4), 2-208(2).
Id. § 2-202 cmt. 2.
Id. § 1-203.
A "merchant? is

a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or
goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may
be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other
intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such
knowledge or skill.
Id. § 2-104(1).
30.
Id. § 2-103(I)(b).
31.
Id. § 2-208(3).
32.
Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 4, at 1783-84. Bernstein notes
that "some courts give greater emphasis to the contract's written terms," but she
finds these decisions to be "in tension with the Code's underlying adjudicative
approach, its definition of agreement, its broad 'duty of good faith,' and its lax
version of the parol evidence rule, which permits these considerations to be
introduced to explain or supplement even a complete and integrated writing." It.
at 1787. See also Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in
Commercial Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 781, 789-92 (1999)(discussing how the UCC
accords past practices priority over explicit terms). But see Mark Garavaglia, In
Search of the ProperLaw in TransnationalCommercial Disputes, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 29, 95-96 (1991) ("In rendering decisions based on the present
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2. The Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods
In 1980, the Convention on Contracts for the International
The CISG became
Sale of Goods was issued for signature.
effective on January 1, 1988 and has been ratified by many
leading trading countries. 3 3
It applies to non-consumer
"contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of
business are in different States" when those states have ratified
the Convention.3 Parties to international sales contracts can opt
out of the rules of the CISG altogether, or they can vary most of
35
its provisions by contract.
The provisions of the CISG on usages of trade and the
parties' dealings are "much less detailed than the Code" but
contain "obvious parallels." 3 6 Article 9(1) of the CISG provides

Code, the modem courts have failed to reference trade usages that exist among
today's merchants.").
33.
The following countries have adopted the CISG: Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile,
China, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia,
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Italy,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Mexico,
Moldova, Mongolia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland,
Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Syria, Uganda, Ukraine, the United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,
Yugoslavia, Zambia. See International Trade Law Branch, United Nations Office of
Legal Affairs, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),
Status of Conventions and Model Laws 6-7 (last updated Dec. 14, 1999) availablein
originalform at <http://www.uncitral.org/english/status/ status.pdf> [hereinafter
UNCITRAL, Status of Conventions and Model Laws].
34.
CISG, supra note 3, art. 1(1)(a). It also applies when only one of the
parties has its place of business in a ratifying state, if a conflict-of-laws analysis
points to that state's law as governing the contract. See id. art. 1(1)(b). The
United States declared when it ratified the CISG that it would not follow this
provision. See UNCITRAL, Status of Conventions and Model Laws, supra note 33,
at 8 n.7.
35.
CISG, supranote 3, art. 6.
36.
E. Allan Farnsworth, Unification of Sales Law: Usage and Course of
Dealing, in UNIFICATION AND COMPARATIVE LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 81, 82
(1984); see also Isaak I. Dore & James E. DeFranco, A Comparison of the NonSubstantive Provisions of the UNCITRAL Convention on the International Sale of
Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 HARv. INT'L L. J. 49, 56 (1982) (noting
the 'basic similarity between the Convention's standard [on usages of trade] and
that of the U.C.C.'). But see Franco Ferrari, The Relationship Between the UCC
and the CISG and the Construction of Uniform Law, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021,
1029-31 (1996) (UCC and CISG concepts of trade usage "cannot be analogized to
each other" because different countries will interpret concepts differently). For a
description of the contentious drafting history of the CISG provision on trade
usages, see Stephen Bainbridge, Note, Trade Usages in International Sales of
Goods: An Analysis of the 1964 and 1980 Sales Conventions, 24 VA. J. INT' L. 619,

634-45 (1984).
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that "[t]he parties are bound by any usage to which they have
agreed and by any practices which they have established between
themselves."3 7 Bianca and Bonell explain that "[e]xcept for the
case in which a party expressly excludes their application for the
future, courses of dealing are automatically applicable not only to
supplement the terms of the contractual agreement but
also... to help to determine the parties' intent."3 8
In addition to being bound by usages to which they agree
and by their prior dealings, parties also are
considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made
applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the
parties knew or ought to have known and which in international
trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to
39
contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned.

The usage need not be an international one, but can be a local
one so long as it is 'widely known to, and regularly observed by"
parties involved in international trade. 4 ° As the CISG provides,
such usages are impliedly applicable unless the parties have
"otherwise agreed." 4 1 Unlike the UCC, the CISG does not require
"careful negation" of usages of trade, 4 2 nor does it include an
express hierarchy of authorities. 4 3 Nonetheless, the Convention
does make clear that in interpreting contracts, "due consideration
is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including
the negotiations, any practices which the parties have established
between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the
44
parties."

37.
CISG, supranote 3, art. 9(1).
38.
Michael Joachim Bonel!, Usages and Practices, in C.M. BIANCA ET AL.,
COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION
103, 106 (1987); see also JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES
UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 175 (2d ed. 1991) ('"Practices' are
established by a course of conduct that creates an expectation that this conduct
will be continued.").
39.
CISG, supranote 3, art. 9(2).
40.
Text of Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods Approved by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.97/5 (1979); see also Commentary on the Draft
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Prepared by the
Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/5 art. 8, cmt. 3 (1979) ('The trade may be
restricted to a certain product, region or set of trading partners"); HONNOLD, supra
note 38, at 178. But see Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law of
International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19 HARV. INTIL L.J. 221,
271-72 (1978) ("a sensible local custom . . . may be thought by some to fall
outside the UNCITRAL provision because it is in conflict with the usual practice
elsewhere").
41.
CISG, supranote 3, art. 9(2).
42.
Bainbridge, supranote 36, at 661.
43.
See Dore & DeFranco, supra note 36, at 59.
44.
CISG, supra note 3, art. 8(3).
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Unlike the UCC, the Convention does not contain a general
duty of good faith and fair dealing. 45 It addresses good faith only
as an interpretative principle: Article 7(1) states that "[iun the
interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in
its application and the observance of good faith in international
trade."4 This provision was adopted as a compromise between
those who favored a general duty of good faith and those who
opposed such a duty because of the uncertainty of its
The CISG does frequently evaluate parties'
application. 4 7
behavior under a standard of "reasonableness,"48 which,
according to Honnold, "can appropriately be determined by
ascertaining what is normal and acceptable in the relevant
49
trade."
°
B. The Informal Norms Critique of the IncorporationStrategy O

Professor Bernstein has strongly criticized the reliance of
commercial codes on commercial norms in resolving contract
disputes.5 1 Because of the relational nature of many contracts,
parties frequently act in ways that differ from their express
contract terms.5 2 For example, "transactors accept late payment,
vary quantity terms, assume new obligations, waive covenants,
and adjust prices in ways that their written contracts do not
Indeed, for any number of reasons, Bernstein
require."5 3
explains, parties may purposefully allocate certain aspects of
their relationship to the nonlegal realm (through their business
practices or informal norms), reserving others for legal
enforcement (through their express contract terms) in the

45.
See Larry A. DiMatteo, The CISG and the Presumptionof Enforceability:
Unintended ContractualLiability in InternationalBusiness Dealings, 22 YALE J. INT'L
L. 111, 145 (1997).
CISG, supranote 3, art. 7(1).
46.
See HONNOLD, supra note 38, at 146.
47.
48.
See CISG, supra note 3, arts. 8(2), 16(2)(b), 18(2), 34, 35(2)(b), 37,
38(3), 39(1), 48(1), 48(2), 49(2), 60(a), 63(1), 72(2), 75, 76(2), 79(1), 79(4), 85, 86(1),
86(2), 88(1), 88(2).

49.

HONNOLD, supra note 38, at 148.

See Kraus & Walt, supranote 4, at 22.
50.
51.
See generally Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 4.
See generally Ian R. MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term
52.
Economic Relations Under Classical,Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72
Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978); see also Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost
Economics: The Governance of ContractualRelations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979);
Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28
AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
53.
Bernstein, Merchant Law, supranote 4, at 1787-88.
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When courts rely on commercial norms to resolve

contract disputes, those norms may be relationship-preserving
norms-norms parties follow when they seek to keep their
relationships together-rather than end-game norms-the norms
the parties have chosen to resolve their dispute when their
relationship is at an end.5 5 By treating commercial practices as
part of the parties' agreement, Bernstein argues, modern
commercial codes preclude the parties from relying on strictly
56
extralegal enforcement of certain aspects of their agreement57
and thereby impose efficiency losses on the contracting parties.
At the same time, Professor Bernstein acknowledges that
commercial norms may be beneficial sources of information for
generalist judges who are seeking to divine what rules the parties
chose at all. She states that "[w]hen a generalist court resolves
disputes between merchants, its interpretative decisions are
likely to come closer to the transactors' expectations if it looks 5to8
trade usage to 'give particular meaning.., to [contract] terms."'

54.
See id. at 1788-94; see also Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal
System.: Extralegal ContractualRelations in the DiamondIndustry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
115, 130-53 (1992).
55.
See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supranote 4, at 1796-1802.
56.
An example of extralegal enforcement would be refusing to deal (or
,threatening to do so) with the other party in the future. See id. at 1788.
57.
See id. at 1794-95, 1808-15. Bernstein explains further:
[B]ecause the risk of adjudicative error is greater when courts enforce
extralegal provisions than it is when they enforce written provisions, the
Code's approach may induce transactors to include written provisions
memorializing the terms of agreements that they would prefer to be
extralegal. Alternatively, if the cost of memorializing the desired extralegal
agreement in the written contract would be prohibitively high, perhaps
because the extralegal agreement seeks to condition on observable but
unverifiable information or because the relational cost of negotiating the
relevant language would be significant, the Code's approach may lead
transactors to forgo both the explicit contractual provisions and the
extralegal agreement, thereby decreasing the total value of the transaction.
Conversely, because the Code's search for the transactor's "bargain in fact"
and its contextualized interpretive approach often weaken the force of a
contract's written provisions, there may be provisions or types of
provisions that transactors would find it worthwhile to negotiate and draft
if they would be enforced as written that they would not find it worthwhile
to negotiate and draft if they thought a court would interpret the
provisions "in context."
Id. at 1795 (footnotes omitted). For a general discussion of possible harmful effects
from enforcing norms with legal sanctions, see RICHARD EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES OF A
FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 41-70
(1998).
58.
Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 4, at 1806 (quoting U.C.C. § 1205 cmt. 4). Professor Bernstein has subsequently argued that this informational
benefit may be slight:
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Whether the marginal benefits of resolving disputes on the basis
of commercial norms outweigh the costs Bernstein has identified
ultimately is an empirical question5 9 that may have different
answers in different commercial contexts.
As her source of empirical evidence, Professor Bernstein
examines arbitration decisions of the National Grain and Feed
Association (NGFA), a trade association in the United States
comprising individuals and firms who actively participate in grain
and feed markets. Disputes among NGFA members are resolved
by arbitration panels consisting of other trade association
members.60
After examining arbitration decisions and
interviewing participants in the industry, she concludes that
NGFA arbitrators "take a formalistic approach to adjudication,"
strictly applying contract provisions and written trade rules to the
exclusion of unwritten practices in the industry or dealings
between the parties. 6 1
More specifically, she finds that
arbitrators adhere to the letter of trade rules and refuse to look at
their underlying purposes. 6 2 The NGFA trade rules impose no
general duty of good faith and fair dealing, and NGFA arbitrators
never decide cases-explicitly at least-on the basis of a violation
of any good faith duty.63 She also finds that NGFA arbitrators
strictly follow a hierarchy of authorities, which ranks both
contract terms and written trade rules ahead of uncodified trade
practices.
Finally, Bernstein finds that arbitrators look to
uncodified trade practices only when both the contract and the
written trade rules are silent, and even then arbitrators
frequently criticize the parties for failing to write a better
contract. 64 Prior dealings between the parties (i.e., course of
performance and course of dealing) are even less important in
NGFA arbitral decisionmaking; they are not included in the
hierarchy of authorities and are rarely the explicit basis for the

[Rjecognizing that the customs often evolve to govern situations where
transactors trust one another and want to continue dealing, but that cases
arise when the very trust that makes the custom workable has broken
down, suggests that there is no reason to suppose that customs will
provide useful information about what contracting parties would have
agreed to had they included a provision stating how the matter at issue
was to be dealt with if third-party adjudication were required.
Bernstein, QuestionableEmpiricalBasis, supranote 4, at 779.

59.
See David Charny, Illusions of Spontaneous Order:
ContractualRelationships, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1841, 1855-56 (1996).
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See Bernstein, MerchantLaw, supranote 4, at 1771-72.
Id. at 1775.
See id.
See id. at 1776.
See id. at 1775-80.

Norns" in
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arbitrators' decision. 65 Arbitrators do rely on both uncodified
trade practices and the parties' prior dealings in evaluating the
credibility of evidence and occasionally as an alternative ground
for decision, and arbitrators "likely" implicitly consider such
evidence in interpreting contractual provisions. 6 6 Nonetheless, in
general, Bernstein concludes, "despite the industry-specific
expertise and business acumen of NGFA arbitrators, in practice
they give far less weight to these indicia of immanent business
norms than do generalist
courts applying the [Uniform
67
Commercial] Code."
Professor Bernstein acknowledges, however, that NGFA
arbitration differs in potentially important ways from
decisionmaking by judges deciding cases under the UCC and the
CISG. 68 Among the possible differences are the following: (1)
contracts in the feed and grain industry tend to be complete and
well-specified, because the contingencies facing the parties are
well known, "[u]nlike many types of contracting relationships
governed by the Code, in which the written contract does not
completely define the relationship between the transactors"; 69 (2)
the transactions at issue in NGFA arbitrations are standardized
with only small amounts at stake; (3) the codified trade rules are
"narrowly tailored to the industry's needs" so that the "marginal
benefit of NGFA arbitrators looking to unwritten usage in an
effort to tailor the meaning of a contractual provision or trade rule
is far less than the marginal benefit of a court looking to these
considerations to tailor a vague Code default rule or interpret an

65.
See id. at 1781-82; see also Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra
note 4, at 109 ("Merchant tribunals have rejected the fundamental premise of the
Code's adjudicative approach, the idea that courts should seek to discover
immanent business norms reflected in merchant practice and merchant
relationships and use them to decide cases.").
66.
See Bernstein, MerchantLaw, supranote 4, at 1779-80, 1782.
67.
Id. at 1771.
68.
Professors Kraus and Walt conclude that "[t]he NGFA study . . .
establishes only that the NGFA provides a superior regime for the members of the
NGFA." Kraus & Walt, supra note 4, at 31. They explain that
[o]f course, an NGFA-like regime that combined custom-tailored, predefined terms with strict construction adjudication would optimize
contractual interpretation for [a group of contracting parties who shared a
narrow set of commercial understandings, needs, and practices]. But the
whole point of the incorporation strategy is to accommodate the
impossibility of ex ante customization in a sales law designed to govern an
extraordinarily heterogeneous population of contractors.
Id. at 31-32.
With such "generalist commercial statutes," they argue, "an
incorporation strategy optimally minimizes the sum of interpretative error and
specification costs [the costs parties incur in specifying their most preferred
contract terms, id. at 8] associated with contract interpretation." Id. at 44.
69.
Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 4, at 1816.
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ambiguous contractual provision";70 and (4) NGFA arbitrators are
participants in the industry, who have greater expertise than
generalist judges and who face greater perceptions of possible
bias in their decisionmaking, which may make formalistic
71
decisionmaking more appropriate in that context.
III. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AS A SOURCE OF

EVIDENCE ON COMMERCIAL NORMS AND CONTRACT DISPUTES

This section argues that international commercial arbitration
can provide valuable evidence about the costs and benefits of
using commercial norms to resolve contract
disputes.
International arbitration serves as a ready substitute for national
court systems in international contracts and is more like
litigation in public courts than the trade association arbitrations
examined
by Professor Bernstein.
Moreover,
because
international commercial arbitration is a highly competitive
industry, the product of this competition-as reflected in
arbitration rules, statutes, and awards-will tend to be rules that
ex ante make the parties better off than alternative sets of rules.
Accordingly, examining the role played by commercial norms in
international arbitrations will help in evaluating the role those
norms should play in resolving contract disputes in public courts.
If the costs of reliance on commercial norms exceed the benefits,
as Professor Bernstein argues, one would expect that commercial
norms would not be used to resolve contract disputes in
international commercial arbitration. If the benefits exceed the
costs, commercial norms likely would play an important role in
resolving contract disputes in international arbitration.
International
commercial arbitration
is not without
limitations as a source of evidence on the use of commercial
norms in resolving contract disputes. The available data are
limited, in large part because arbitration proceedings are
confidential. In addition, evaluating that evidence is difficult
because of significant overlaps between rules, statutes, and the
arbitrators' ultimate awards and because of the presence of
model rules and laws in the area.
Finally, international
commercial arbitration by definition involves international
contracts and international disputes, which makes any insights

70.

Id. at 1818.

71.
Bernstein ultimately concludes that, rather than imposing a formalistic
adjudicatory approach on the UCC, a more appropriate response would be to
amend the Code 'to include a 'safe harbor' provision that would give merchanttransactors a simple and reliable way to either opt out of the Code's adjudicative
approach or selectively opt out of its usage of trade, course of performance, or
course of dealing provisions." Id. at 1820-21.
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derived from the evidence of uncertain value for the largely
domestic disputes addressed by national commercial laws. 7 2
Nonetheless, even with these limitations, the evidence that can be
gleaned from international commercial arbitration still should be
useful in evaluating the incorporation of commercial norms into
commercial codes.
A. The Practiceof InternationalCommercialArbitration
International commercial arbitration is the accepted way of
resolving international business disputes. 73 As stated by one
international lawyer, "[i]n today's world the dispute resolution
mechanism will invariably be arbitration." 74 One estimate is that
ninety percent of all international contracts contain arbitration
clauses. 75
"International commercial arbitration" is a broad
designation that could include the activities of a multitude of
trade associations in adjudicating disputes between parties from
different countries. 76 In accord with common usage, this article
does not use the phrase so broadly. 77 Instead, by international
commercial arbitration this article refers to non-specialized
arbitration between private parties involved in international
commercial transactions.
International commercial arbitration provides a closer
analogue to court litigation than does the trade association
arbitration examined by Professor Bernstein. International
arbitration proceedings are a close substitute for proceedings in
public court systems. 78 The principal reason parties choose to

72.
This weakness, of course, would not affect the CISG, which applies
only to international transactions.
73.
See Gerald Aksen, Arbitrationand Other Means of Dispute Settlemen in
INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO WORKING WITH FOREIGN

INVESTORS IN THE U.S. AND ABROAD 287, 287 (David N. Goldsweig & Roger H.
Cummings eds., 2d ed. 1990); see also Pierre Lalive, Transnational (or Truly
International)Public Policy and InternationalArbitration, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION
PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION 257, 293 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1987)
("International arbitration is now known to be 'the' ordinary and normal method of
settling disputes of international trade").
74.
See Aksen, supra note 73, at 287.

75.

See KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 8 n.62

(1993) (citing ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG ET AL., ARBITRAGERECHT 134 (1988)).
76.
See CHRISTIAN
BOHRING-UHLE,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 45 (1996).

ARBITRATION

AND

MEDIATION

IN

77.
See, e.g., id. ("although [specialized arbitrations] doubtlessly are international, commercial, and arbitrations, they are commonly not covered by the
general literature on international commercial arbitration."); ALAN REDFERN &
MARTIN HUNTER, LAw AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 52-

53 (2d ed. 1991).
78.

See Charles N. Brower, Introductionto INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE

21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS "JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFORMITY? ix-x (Richard B. Lillich
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arbitrate international commercial disputes is because neither
party is comfortable litigating in the public courts of the other's
home country. 7 9 Although in particular cases arbitration may
have other advantages-such as flexibility, speed, finality,
arbitrator expertise, and the preservation of the parties'
relationship 8°-as a general matter it is the desire to avoid
"hometown justice" that is decisive. 8 1 Charles N. Brower, an
international lawyer and arbitrator, has made this point as
follows:
By and large, parties to international transactions choose to
arbitrate eventual disputes not because arbitration is simpler than
litigation, not because it is cheaper, not because it is "final and
binding" and therefore substantially unreviewable, and not because
arbitrators may have greater relevant expertise than national
judges, although any one of those factors may be of interest; they
arbitrate simply because neither will suffer its rights and
obligations to be determined by the courts of the other party's state
of nationality. International arbitration thus is in large measure a
82
substitute for national court litigation.

A secondary reason parties choose to arbitrate international
disputes is that arbitration awards are easier to enforce than
court judgments.8 3
Several international treaties, the most
important of which is the New York Convention, 8 4 create a legal

& Charles N. Brower eds., 1994) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE
21sT CENTURY].
79.
See Aksen, supranote 73, at 287-88.
80.
Although it is difficult to be sure from the truncated facts reported in
the awards, most of the parties involved in the international arbitrations studied
in this article appear to be at the end of their contractual relationships. This is
consistent with Professor Bernstein's finding that even in the trade association
context, "traders who arbitrated against one another often viewed their
relationship as being at an absolute end-game." Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra
note 4, at 1797 n.104. The companies employing the traders, by comparison,
'viewed themselves as being in an end-game round-they were willing to deal with
one another again in the future, but the plaintiff-company nevertheless fought
hard for the application of [end-game norms]." Id.; see also Bernstein,
Questionable Empirical Basis, supra note 4, at 766 n.210 (presenting "evidence
that in some merchant tribunals most cases are end-game disputes").
81.
See William W. Park, ArbitrationAvoids 'Hometown Justice' Overseas,
NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1998, at C18.
82.
Brower, supra note 78, at x.
83.
In a survey of persons involved in international arbitration, 72% of
respondents identified the neutrality of the forum as "highly relevant" in deciding
whether to choose arbitration and 64% identified the enforceability of awards as
highly relevant. The next two most popular reasons were that the forum has
expertise (36%) and that there is no appeal (37%). See BOHRING-UHLE, supra note
76, at app. 1 at 395.
84.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention].
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framework through which international arbitration awards can
readily be enforced throughout much of the world.
Procedurally, international commercial arbitration is becoming
more and more like public court litigation, particularly public court
litigation as practiced in the United States.
Numerous
commentators have identified-and some have decried-this socalled judicialization" of arbitration. 85 Yves Dezalay and Bryant
Garth explain:
The legitimacy of international commercial arbitration is no longer
built on the fact that arbitration is informal and close to the needs
of business; rather legitimacy now comes more from a recognition
that arbitration is formal and close to the kind of resolution that
would be produced through litigation-more precisely, through the
86
negotiation that takes place in the context of U.S.-style litigation.

For present purposes it is irrelevant whether the "judicialization"
of arbitration is good or bad for the parties to arbitration,
although if the parties were dissatisfied presumably they could
choose less "judicial" forms of dispute resolution. Instead, the
judicialization of arbitration is relevant here because it reinforces
the similarities between international commercial arbitration and
public court litigation. By comparison, in this regard both court
litigation and international arbitration differ from more
specialized trade association arbitration, which tends to be less
87
formal in its procedures.
Arbitrators in international commercial arbitrations, like public
court judges, tend to be generalists in substantive legal knowledge
but specialists in legal procedure. 8 8 International arbitrators are
ordinarily lawyers or academics rather than persons engaged in the
same business as the parties to the arbitration. 8 9 Jacques Wemer
has stated:

85.
See Thomas E. Carbonneau, National Law and the Judicializationof
Arbitration: Manifest Destiny, Manifest Disregard, or Manifest Error, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21sT CENTURY, supra note 78, at 115, 117; Arthur W.

Rovine, Fast-Track Arbitration.: A Step Away from Judicialization of International
Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 78, at

45, 47 ("the trend toward judicialization, while uneven, is likely to continue,"
although recent examples of fast-track arbitration are contrary to trend);
International Arbitration, 1996 PROC. AM. Soc'k INT'L L. 244, 252-53 (remarks of
Andreas Lowenfeld) ("arbitration has become more legalistic. There is more
motion practice, there are more disputes within disputes").
86.
Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Fussing about the Forum: Categories and
Definitions as Stakes in a Professional Competition, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 285, 299
(1996).
87.
See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 77, at 52-53; see also Soia
Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 846 (1961).
88.
See Jacques Werner, The Trade Explosion and Some Likely Effects on
InternationalArbitration,J. INT'L ARB., June 1997, at 5, 11.
89.

See id. at 10.
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Historically, arbitration was justice by peers, namely by those
actively engaged in the same trade as the disputing parties, and

who consequently did not need to be tutored in the technicalities of
the dispute in order to understand the case....
Arbitration by peers has, however, been practically killed [oft]
within the broad world of general international commercial
arbitration....
Arbitral justice in international commercial cases is almost always
rendered by business lawyers in private practice, and sometimes by
academics.

90

Again, this is in contrast to trade association arbitrations, in
which arbitrators frequently are not lawyers and generally do
have substantial expertise in the industry involved. 91 Because
one of the main benefits of incorporating commercial norms into
commercial codes is an informational one-it may assist
generalist judges in better understanding the parties'
agreement-the fact that international arbitrators (unlike trade
association arbitrators) tend not to have specialized knowledge of
the industry is an especially important similarity to public court
litigation.
International commercial arbitrators decide a wide range of
cases and subject matters. In this respect they are like public
court judges and unlike the trade association arbitrators studied
by Professor Bernstein, who deal with largely standardized
transactions. 92
International commercial arbitrations also
involve higher stakes than the trade association arbitrations in
Professor Bernstein's study. The ICC reported that 12.4 percent
of its arbitrations in 1996 involved amounts in dispute of over ten
million dollars. 93 By comparison, the largest award by a NGFA
94
tribunal between 1975 and 1990 was just over $138,000.
Accordingly, the consequences of error by the international
arbitrator are likely to be more like those in public court litigation
than in NGFA arbitration, which Professor Bernstein
acknowledges "will often be small relative to the assets of the
parties."9 5 For all of these reasons, international commercial
arbitration should be a better source of evidence on the use of
commercial norms in resolving contract disputes than the trade
association arbitrations examined by Professor Bernstein.

90.
Id. at 10-11.
91.
See REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 77, at 52; Mentschikoff, supra note
87, at 859-60. Certainly, parties involved in international arbitrations may choose
arbitrators who are specialists. My point is that international arbitrators are less
likely to be specialists than are trade association arbitrators.
92.
See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supranote 4, at 1818.
93.
See ICC INT'L COURT OF ARB. BULL., May 1997, at 8.
94.
See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supranote 4, at 1817 & n. 157.
95.
Id. at 1817.
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B. Competition in InternationalCommercial Arbitration
International commercial arbitration is a highly competitive
business. As stated by Jacques Werner, "Being today recognized
for what it is, namely a service industry, international arbitration
has become a field of intense competition: competition between
the arbitration sites, between the arbitral institutions, between
counsel, between arbitrators, and even between the periodicals
Administering institutions
on international arbitration."9 6
compete fiercely as to the fees they charge for their services as
well as to the procedures followed in the arbitrations they
administer.9 7 Countries (like American states in corporate law)
compete to be selected the situs for international commercial
98
arbitrations and to obtain the financial benefits that follow.
Arbitrators compete with other arbitrators to be selected to serve
in a particular case; unlike public judges, who ordinarily get paid
a fixed salary regardless of how many cases they decide or how
they decide those cases, arbitrators get paid only when they are
chosen. 9 9 International lawyers facilitate this competition by
reducing the costs of finding and adopting alternative arbitral
Accordingly, if institutional rules or international
schemes.1 0
arbitration laws require arbitrators to follow commercial norms in
deciding disputes or if many arbitrators in fact decide disputes
using such norms, that provides strong evidence that such rules
ex ante benefit the parties involved.' 0 1

96.
Jacques Werner, Competition Within the Arbitration Industry, J. INT'L
ARB., June 1985, at 5, 5; see also Jacques Wemer, International Commercial
Arbitrators:From Merchant to Academic to Skilled Professional, DisP. RESOL. MAG.,
Spring 1998, at 22, 22 ("international commercial arbitration is a market"); Larry
Smith & Lori Tripoli, Privatized International Dispute Settlement . . . Competing
Arbitration Centers Mean User-Friendly Resolutions Worldwide, INSIDE LITIG., May
1998, at 1, 1 ("the same free market zeal that has transformed the global economy
is transforming global litigation and dispute resolution").
See infranotes 102-14 and accompanying text.
97.
See infra notes 115-33 and accompanying text.
98.
See infra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
99.
100.
See infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
I do not, and need not, claim that the commercial norms reflected in
101.
trade usages and prior dealings necessarily are efficient ones. Some
commentators are skeptical whether norms are likely to be efficient. See, e.g.,
Bernstein, Questionable Empirical Basis, supra note 4, at 754-57; Eric Posner,
Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697 (1996); Kraus,
supra note 2, at 409-19; Richard H. McAdams, Comment: Accounting for Norms,
1997 WIS. L. REv. 625, 635; McAdams, supranote 2. Instead, the relevant policy
question is whether commercial norms are superior to alternative sources of
default rules. See Kraus & Walt, supranote 4; Gillette, supra note 4, at 741. The
evidence presented later suggests that parties to international contracts act as
though they are. See infra notes 157-201 and accompanying text.
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1. Competition Among Arbitral Institutions
Virtually every major trading city has at least one-if not
several-institutions that, for a fee, will provide services to parties
that wish to avoid each other's home courts. The number of
arbitral institutions has increased dramatically in the past
several decades.1 0 2 Institutions provide a variety of services to
the arbitrating parties. First, the arbitral institution provides a
03
standard set of procedural rules to govern the arbitration.
Parties who specify in an arbitration clause a particular
institution thereby adopt its rules as a standard form subject to
any changes agreed to by the parties.1° 4 Second, the arbitral
institution serves as an "appointing authority" that provides

Indeed, much of the discussion of the efficiency of norms versus alternative
sources of default rules (such as model statutes) applies to the rules governing the
use of trade usages in international commercial arbitration. Arguments that
commercial norms or standard contract terms may not be efficient because of
network effects and learning benefits, compare, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The
Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997) and Michael Klausner,
Corporations,CorporateLaw, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995)
ufith Gillette, supra note 4, may apply to international arbitration rules governing
trade usages as well. Alternative sources of international arbitration rules, such
as UNCITRAL, have been criticized as private legislatures subject to similar
interest group influences as public legislatures. Paul B. Stephen, The Futility of
Uni/ication and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L.
743, 756-61 (1999); Paul B. Stephen, Accountability and InternationalLawmaking:
Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. INT' L. & Bus. 681, 700-02 (1996-97); Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The PoliticalEconomy of Private Legislatures, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 595 (1995); Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV.
1783 (1994). The CISG trade usage provision, in particular, was the subject of a
well-documented dispute between more-developed countries and socialist and
less-developed countries, with the latter two groups fearing that existing trade
usages unduly favored the more developed countries. See Chen, supra note 21, at
104-05; CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW: DOMESTIC &
INTERNATIONAL 94-95 (1999).
Conceivably, such differing viewpoints on trade
usages may have influenced the drafters of the UNCITRAL Model Rules and Model
Law as well.
This article does not purport to resolve all of these issues. Instead, it simply
argues that, given the similarities between international arbitration and public
court litigation and the competitiveness of the international arbitration market,
evidence on the role of trade usages in international commercial arbitration is
relevant to the debate. If the evidence shows that trade usages play an important
role in international arbitration, it at least suggests that incorporation of trade
usages into commercial codes is superior to other sources of default rules for
resolving contract disputes.
102.
See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING INVIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 6
& n.2 (1996); Robert Clow & Patrick Stewart, InternationalArbitration:Storming the
Citadels,INTL FIN. L. REV., Mar. 1990, at 10; Smith & Tripoli, supra note 96, at 1.
103.
See DEZALAY & GARTH, supranote 102, at 5.
104.
See id.
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backup arbitrator selection services for the parties if they cannot
agree.1 0 5
Third, the arbitral institution may provide various

administrative services to the parties, such as serving as the
clearinghouse through which their filings are processed.
These institutions compete fiercely in seeking to attract
arbitration business.1 0 6 The long-standing leader in the field is
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which is
headquartered in Paris. The ICC once had a "quasi-monopoly

position"; although it remains the most prominent institution, the
ICC's market share has declined in the face of increased
competition from new and existing arbitral institutions.1 0 7 In
response to this competition, the ICC has reduced the fees it
charges for its services 0 8 and amended its rules to make them
more attractive to potential contracting parties.1 ° 9 Other leading
international arbitration institutions include the American
Arbitration Association, the London Court of International
Arbitration, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, the Federal
Economic Chamber in Vienna, and the China International
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC). 110

105.
See id. at 6.
106. Although many international arbitration institutions are organized as
not-for-profit entities, and thus have somewhat different incentives than for-profit
entities, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 14.2, at 430 (5th ed.

1998), they nonetheless compete with each other in the market for international
commercial arbitration services.
107. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 102, at 45; Smith & Tripoli, supra
note 96, at 2.
108. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 102, at 44; InternationalArbitration,
1996 PRoc. Am. SocY INTL L. 244, 249 (remarks of Gerald Aksen):
Years ago, the ICC used to charge fees with an unlimited amount. Today
those fees are capped, so that you can no longer pay more than $50,000,
or $25,000, per party, even if you have a billion-dollar case. That was
probably brought about by competition ....

The AAA lowered its fees.

Why? Because of competition.
109.
See Smith & Tripoli, supra note 96, at 2 ("Clearly the motive [for ICC
rules revisions] was competitive. Simply enough, the ICC has opted for less
restrictive procedures because other 'arbitration sites are taking business from
them,' according to [Bernard] LeSage [, a partner at Buchalter, Nemer, Fields &
Younger in Los Angeles].
'It's losing market share.'); Stephen R. Bond &
Christopher R. Seppala, The New (1998) Rules of Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce, MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REPORTS, May 1997 (explaining that
"[t]he ICC revises its Rules of Arbitration from time to time so as to adapt them to
the current needs of the international business community" and summarizing
1998 changes). See generally W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., ANNOTATED GUIDE TO THE
1998 ARBITRATION RULES WITH COMMENTARY, 27-185 (1998) (text of new ICC rules
with commentary).
110.
See Clow & Stewart, supra note 102, at 11-12; James H. Carter,
International Commercial Dispute Resolution, Disp. RESOL. J., Apr.- Sept. 1996, at
95, 95 & 99 n.2.
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Because of the consensual nature of international
arbitration, parties are likely to agree to arbitrate under the rules
of a particular institution if that best serves their interests,
subject to the informational costs of evaluating alternative
If parties ex ante were better off litigating
arrangements." 1
rules-including any rule addressing
institutional
under different
all else being equal, name
would,
commercial norms-they
1 12
their arbitration clauses.
in
institution
administering
another
Indeed, institutions consult widely with users of the rules so that
the rules as promulgated best meet the needs of their
customers.1 13 To the extent institutional rules persist, it is

See ComparativeAnalysis of InternationalDispute Resolution Institutions,
111.
1991 PROC. AM. SocY INTL L. 64, 67 (remarks of David D. Caron) ("This is not to
imply that there exists a perfect market. A limiting factor is that consumer
knowledge often is incomplete. Even for the knowledgeable consumer, there are
so many variables to weight that it can be quite difficult to select the 'best'
mechanism."); BERGER, supra note 75, at 7 ("Unfortunately, the multi-facetedness
of the subject matter has created more confusion than transparency"). But see
Bond & Seppala, supranote 109, at 90:
However imperfectly the parties and their counsel assimilate information
concerning the particularities of the relevant legal context of the various
alternative sites, it seems clear that over the medium term a significant
number of those concerned do form judgements based on an
understanding of how these particularities affect their real interests, as
opposed to the more ephemeral attractions of the locales.
See POSNER, supra note 106, § 4.7, at 127-28 (describing effect of
112.
competition on standard form contracts: "If one seller offers unattractive terms, a
competing seller, wanting sales for himself, will offer more attractive terms. The
process will continue until the terms are optimal.").
Howard M. Holtzmann, Balancing the Need for Certainty and Flexibility
113.
in International Arbitration Procedures, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST
CENTURY, supra note 78, at 3, 7 n.10 (AAA International Rules "have undergone
searching scrutiny by international arbitrators, practitioners and arbitration
administrators to ensure that they embody provisions which contemporary
practice calls for and with which both American and foreign attorneys are
comfortable') (quoting Michael F. Hoellering, How to Draft an AAA Arbitration
Clause 5-6) (unpublished paper delivered at Eighth ICSID/ICC/AAA Joint
Colloquium on International Arbitration, Washington, D.C., Nov. 11, 1991);
American Arbitration Association Task Force on the International Rules,
Commentary on the Proposed Revisions to the International Arbitration Rules of
the American Arbitration Association (describing work of task force in developing
revisions to AAA International Rules), reprinted in JACK J. COE, JR., INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT
587 app. 24 (1997); Discussion Draft-Arbitration Rules of the LCIA (explaining
that 'permanent subcommittee [of the London Court of International Arbitration]
has kept [the arbitration rules] under constant review, considering difficulties and
criticisms that have arisen"), reprinted in COE, supra, at 709 app. 33A.
I

102

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL. 33:79

evidence that they make the parties better off than alternative

rules."

4

2. Competition Among Arbitral Sites
Countries compete to be venues in which international
International arbitration
arbitration hearings are held. 1i 5
hearings are very mobile. To enhance enforceability, the award
must be made in a country that is party to the New York
Convention; 116 otherwise, the parties are free to choose the situs
where the arbitration will take place and the award will be
made. 117 Prospective arbitration sites have a strong incentive to
make their arbitration laws responsive to the demands of the
consumers of arbitration services. As one American commentator
stated, "[b]ecoming a venue for arbitration can be a very lucrative
business and, especially in the international arena, is seen as a
distinctly desirable objective." 1 18
There is strong evidence of competition among international
arbitration venues." 9 A number of countries in recent years

See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private
114.
Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 249-53 (1979) (examining implications of using
'arbitral procedures as a standard of judicial efficiency").
115.
See Kazuo Iwasald, Selection of Situs: Criteria and Priorities,2 ARB. INT'L
57, 57 (1986).
See, e.g., id. at 64-65. At present, over 120 countries are parties to the
116.
Convention. See UNCITRAL, Status of Conventions and Model Laws, supranote 33,
at 9-14.
See Iwasald, supra note 115, at 66-67 (explaining that parties to an
117.
arbitration want predictability and a speedy outcome).
118. TOM CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
A proponent of the United Kingdom's Arbitration Act of 1979
638 (1997).
contended that the amendments might bring in £,500 million to the British
economy, in counsel, arbitrator, and witness fees, hotel rates, and the like. See
W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 467
(2d ed. 1990) (citing Lord Cullen of Ashborne). But see DEZALAY & GARTH, supra
note 102, at 299 n. 21 (dismissing such estimates: 'ft]he same individuals today
admit that the estimates, widely reported by the press, were complete
inventions"). One writer points out that "the total hotel costs for those involved in
the proceedings (parties, arbitrators, counsel, secretaries, etc.) often exceed the
overall costs of an arbitration thirty years ago." BERGER, supranote 75, at 6 n.54.
See BERGER, supranote 75, at 6 & n.55:
119.
Since the beginning of the eighties legislatures have begun to respond to
the needs of international practice and have enacted new arbitration laws
as 'marketing strategies,' intended to send a signaling effect to the
international arbitration community of the userfriendliness of their legal
environment and of the quality of services offered in these jurisdictions.
See also Filip De Ly, The Place of Arbitrationin the Conflict of Laws of International
Commercial Arbitration: An Exercise in Arbitration Planning, 12 Nw. J. INTL L. &
BUS. 48, 48-49 (1991):
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have amended their arbitration laws for the stated reason of
making the country more attractive as a venue for international
arbitrations. 1 20 Belgium has taken among the most radical steps
by providing that in international arbitrations with no connection
to Belgium other than that Belgium serves as the arbitral situs,
Belgian courts may not vacate the award for any reason. 12 1 One
of the principal reasons for this change was to make Belgium
more attractive as a venue for international arbitrations. 122 In a
study of ICC arbitrations, Stephen Bond has traced how parties
responded to court decisions or laws unfavorable to arbitration by
once the decision or law was changed,
avoiding the situs, and,
12 3
returned to that situs.

[M]ost changes [to arbitration laws] were to a large extent inspired by
concerns of either maintaining a country's status as one hospitable to
international commercial arbitration or of promoting a country with little
arbitration tradition. This phenomenon of international regulatory
competition was, inter alia, the result of efforts by domestic lobbies to
initiate or encourage domestic legislators to look afresh at arbitration laws.
Given its international context, regulatory competition definitely led to
some deregulation or liberalization of arbitration law.
(footnotes omitted); Pieter Sanders, Arbitration, in 16 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF COMPARATIVE LAW: CIVIL PROCEDURE, at 12-29 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1996)
("Modernization of arbitration laws is inspired by the desire to make arbitration
more attractive to its users. A certain competition between countries to attract
arbitration to be held in their country can be noted."); Werner, International
Commercial Arbitrators:From Merchant to Academic to Skilled Professional, supra
note 96, at 22.
120.
For example, supporters of Ireland's recent enactment of the
UNCITRAL Model Law cited the benefits to Ireland of becoming a more competitive
venue for international commercial arbitration. See Press Release, O'Donoghue

Publishes Bill Designed to Attract International Inward Investment to Ireland (Oct.
2, 1997) <www.irlgovie:80justice/Press%20Releases/Press-97/pr-O210b.htm>
(ftheresolution of international business disputes through arbitration is a major
economic and business activity on a worldwide scale. This Bill when passed into
law will enable Ireland to claim its share of this economic activity" (quoting John
O'Donoghue, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform)); Debates of the
Houses of the Oireachtas on Arbitration (International Commercial) Bill, 1997:
Second Stage <www.irlgov.ie:80/debates/sl4may98/ sect2.htm> ("The fact that
Ireland has adopted a common international standard and has improved on it
strengthens our ability to market for a substantial share of the global business in
this area.") (remarks of Mrs. Taylor Quinn)); id. ('London, a relatively recent
entrant to the market, is estimated to generate £100 million annually from this
international arbitration business.... [W]e wish well people here who wish to
proceed in this area.") (remarks of Miss M. Wallace)).
121. Belgian Judicial Code, art. 1717, reprintedin 11 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB.
369 (1986).
122. See Albert Jan van den Berg, Annulment of Awards in International
Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 78, at

133, 141.
123. See Bond & Seppala, supranote 109, at 86-90.
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Some arbitration commentators have been critical of this
competition among arbitral sites.1 24 An American commentator
on arbitration has complained that "Imlany jurisdictions have
flung their regulatory authority to the winds in order to climb
upon the 'hospitable-jurisdiction-to arbitration' bandwagon and
advertise their availability as venues to arbitration. 125 The
competition among arbitral sites has been likened to the
supposed "race-to-the-bottom" in corporate and environmental
law. 126
The analogy to competition for corporate charters in the
United States is a useful and close one. Parties can choose a
country as a situs for arbitration merely by so providing in their
contract or by agreeing after a dispute has arisen. They need
have no other connection with the situs, much as companies can
incorporate in a state where they do no business. Although it is
difficult to choose a new situs once a dispute has arisen (because
both parties must agree),1 2 7 in future contracts parties readily
can select a different situs, much as companies can reincorporate
in another state at minimal cost. International arbitration even
has a rough equivalent to the corporate law "internal affairs
doctrine."
In countries that are party to the New York
Convention, the arbitral situs, and no other country, can vacate
an arbitration award.1 2 8 The equivalence is not exact, however.
Countries in which enforcement of an award is sought still have
the authority to decide whether to enforce the award, although
that authority is substantially limited in countries that are party

124.
Not all international arbitration commentators have been critical. See,
e.g., Michael F. Hoellering, International Commercial Arbitration:A Peaceful Method
of Dispute Settlement, ARB. J., Dec. 1985, at 19, 21 (calling the "true competition"
between arbitral venues "a healthy development, which should result in
continuing improvement of the conditions for arbitration worldwide"); Aleksandar
Goldgtan, Choice of InternationalArbitrators,Arbitral Tribunals and Centres: Legal
and Sociological Aspects, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 27,
29 (Petar gardevid ed., 1989) ("endeavours of individual places and centres of
international commercial arbitration to attract international clientele ... should
lead to improvements in national legislation and practices and consequently
improve arbitration between domestic and foreign firms").
125.
CARBONNEAU, supra note 118, at 639.
126.
See BERGER, supra note 75, at 8-9 ("one must question whether the
competition of national legislatures, initiated mainly through the economic
interests, wishes and proposals of foreign practitioners, may not lead to a
'Delaware-effect' and hence to a standard of lawmaking which is unacceptable in
view of the practical significance of the subject matter").
127.

GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED

STATES: COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 77 (1994) (stating that "[w]here the parties do
not agree, changing the arbitral status from what was contractually designated is
much less likely").
128.
See, e.g., International Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad
Anonima Petrolera, 745 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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exclusive
to the New York Convention, which sets out limited and
12 9
grounds for refusing to enforce international awards.
Although the competition among countries to serve as
arbitration venues resembles the competition for corporate
charters, neither properly is characterized as a "race-to-thebottom." As Ralph Winter, Roberta Romano, and others have
explained, corporate managers are restrained from incorporating
or reincorporating to the detriment of shareholders by
competition in capital, product, and labor markets and by the
market for corporate control.13 0 Romano has concluded that
"[t]he best available evidence indicates that, for the most part, the
race is for the top and not the bottom in the production of
corporate laws."' 3 1 Indeed, Richard Revesz argues that, in the
absence
of interjurisdictional
externalities-and
perhaps
divergent interests between agents and principals---"competition
among the states for industry should not be expected to lead to a
race that decreases social welfare; indeed, as in other areas, such
competition can be expected to produce an efficient allocation of
industrial activity among the states."1 3 2 Given the consensual
nature of arbitration, the costs resulting from the choice of
arbitral forum will largely be borne by the contracting parties; in
other words, there seem to be few or no interstate externalities.
Although there might be some concern about attorneys (agents)
not acting in the interests of their clients (principals) in selecting
arbitral sites, that concern is not the focus of those who fear a
"race-to-the-bottom" among arbitral venues.
Moreover,
competition in the market for legal services presumably will hold
down such agency costs.1 3 3
Accordingly, interjurisdictional
competition among arbitral sites seems likely to improve the
efficiency of the laws subject to such competition.

129.
See New York Convention, supra note 84, art. V; BoRN, supranote 127,
at 517-18.
130.
See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the
Theory of the Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977); Roberta Romano, State
Competition for Corporate Charters, in THE NEW FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE
TRUSTED? 129 (John Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1997).
131.
Romano, supra note 130, at 149.
132.
Richard L. Revesz, RehabilitatingInterstate Competition: Rethinking the
aRace-to-the-Bottom' Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1210, 1211-12 (1992); see also id. at 1247-53.
133.
Cf. Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the
Rules of Procedure,23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 637 (1994) (describing development of
market mechanisms that 'mitigate the agency cost problems that exist between
lawyers and their clients").
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3. Competition Among Arbitrators
International arbitrators, too, compete to be selected by
parties to resolve their disputes.1' 4 The number of persons
seeking to serve as arbitrators has increased dramatically in
recent years. 135 Unlike the choice of arbitral institution, and
commonly the arbitral situs, parties ordinarily choose arbitrators
after the dispute arises rather than before. 13 6 Under the most
commonly used mechanism for arbitrator selection in
international arbitration, each party appoints one arbitrator and
the two party-appointed arbitrators then choose the third,
presiding arbitrator. 13 7 In international arbitration, however,
even party-appointed arbitrators must be free of significant
connections with either party or else they are subject to challenge
by the other side. 138
The competition among arbitrators gives them different
incentives than public court judges, who generally do not
compete to attract litigation. Indeed, public court judges, who
receive a fixed salary, have the incentive on the margin to decide
cases so as to enhance their own leisure and prospects for
l3 9
advancement to a higher court, among other motivations.
Because arbitrators only get paid when they are selected by the
parties to decide a case, they "have to attract business" and "so
they are exposed to the same market pressures as anyone who

See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 102, at 31; Werner, International
134.
Commercial Arbitrators: From Merchant to Academic to Skilled Professional,
supra note 96, at 22.
See Werner, International Commercial Arbitrators: From Merchant to
135.
Academic to Skilled Professional,supranote 96, at 28 n.3. See generally PARKER
SCHOOL OF FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW, ROSTER OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATORS
(1997).
136.
See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 102, at 6.
137.
See W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
CASES, MATERIALS AND NOTES ON THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
DISPUTES 541, 557-58 (1997); RULES OF ARBITRATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER

OF COMMERCE art. 8(4) (1998).
See INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, RULES OF ETHICS FOR INTERNATIONAL
138.
ARBITRATORS arts. 3-4; RULES OF ARBITRATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE arts. 7(1)-(3), 11; INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES OF THE AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION arts. 7-8.

See Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's
139.
'Unconstitutional" about the Sentencing CommissionP, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 183,
183-84 (1991); Mark A. Cohen, The Motives of Judges: Empirical Evidence from
Antitrust Sentencing, 12 INTIL REV. L. & ECON. 13, 13-14 (1992); Christopher R.

Drahozal, JudicialIncentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L. REV. 469, 474-78
(1998); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same
Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 1, 1-2, 13-15 (1993); Gregory

C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of
JudicialReasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1377, 1383-84, 1487-93 (1998).
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sells a service." 14° As a result, international arbitrators have
strong incentives to make decisions that make both parties to the
case, ex ante, better off. As Robert Cooter argues, "incomemaximizing private judges make decisions which are Pareto
14 1
efficient with respect to the litigants (pair-wise efficient)."
International arbitration awards thus will tend to reflect parties'
preferred treatment of commercial norms in dispute resolution.
4. International Lawyers as "Transaction Cost Engineers"
Competition in the business of international commercial
arbitration is heightened by international lawyers, who use their
expertise on behalf of clients to help them pick beneficial
methods of dispute resolution. Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth
explain that "[m]ultinational law firms accelerate this competition
by their ability to forum shop-both in contractual negotiations
and after disputes arise-among institutions, sets of rules, laws,
and arbitrators." 142 Although even expert international lawyers
lack perfect information about all available alternatives,'4 it
nonetheless seems likely that the market for international
arbitration services works reasonably well. The importance of
lawyers in the competitive process is another illustration of what
Ronald Gilson calls lawyers as 'transaction cost engineers";'4
the lawyers create value for their clients by "design[ing]45 efficient
systems to resolve conflict outside of court at low cost."'

C. InternationalCommercialArbitrationas a Source of Evidence:
Predictionsand Limitations
As the previous sections have explained, international
commercial arbitration more closely resembles litigation in public

140.
Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and PublicJudges, 41 PUB.
CHOICE 107, 107 (1983); see also GORDON TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL: THE PURE
THEORY OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 122, 127-33 (1980); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Trial Courts: An Economic Perspective, 24 L. & SOCky REV. 533, 545
(1990); Drahozal, supra note 139, at 50 1-02.
141.
Cooter, supra note 140, at 107.
142. Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Merchants of Law as Moral
Entrepreneurs: Constructing International Justice from the Competition for
TransnationalBusiness Disputes, 29 L. & SocY REv. 27, 45 (1995).
143.
See supranote 111 and accompanying text.
144.
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Laujers:Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing,94 YALE L.J. 239, 243, 253-56 (1984). See generally Symposium on
Business Lauyering and Value Creationfor Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1 (1995).
145.
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreward: Business Lawyers
and Value Creationfor Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 8 (1995); see also Gillette, supra
note 4, at 734 (attorneys can "become the equivalent of entrepreneurs who are
able to recover the costs of new technology once they publicize its superiority to
potential users," and thus may have incentive to promote legal innovations).
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courts than trade association arbitration and is the product of a
highly competitive industry. Accordingly, examining the role of
commercial norms in resolving contract disputes in international
arbitration should provide valuable evidence for evaluating the
incorporation strategy followed by modem commercial codes. If
the costs of relying on commercial norms to resolve contract
disputes in fact exceed the benefits, such that incorporation of
commercial norms into commercial codes is inappropriate, then
one would expect to find in international commercial arbitration
the sort of formalistic decisionmaking found by Professor
Bernstein in trade association arbitrations. If the benefits to
generalist decisionmakers exceed the costs, one would expect to
find commercial norms used to resolve contract disputes in
international arbitration.
International commercial arbitration is subject to several
limitations as a setting in which to examine the role of
commercial norms in resolving commercial disputes. First, data
on the subject is not widely available.
Arbitration awards
ordinarily are confidential, and only a non-random sample is
made public, usually without identifying the parties or the
arbitrators involved.' 4 6 Some of the published awards are so
heavily edited that it is difficult to understand what actually
happened. The rules of the various arbitration institutions are
more widely available; however, data on the frequency with which
those rules are utilized is poor. Almost no data is available on
the extent to which the rules are incorporated into arbitration
agreements. Some data is available on the number of disputes
arbitrated under the rules of various institutions, 14 7 but even
that data is unreliable. 148 Accordingly, the analysis that follows
in Part IV is largely impressionistic.
Second, there can be a substantial degree of overlap between
the provisions of institutional rules and arbitration statutes, the
substantive laws applicable to the dispute, and the rationale of
the arbitrators in making their award. If the institutional rules or
the arbitration laws of the situs require the arbitrators to take

146.
See, e.g., COE, supra note 113, at 87; Lord Justice Mustill, The New Lex
Mercatoria: The First Twenty-Five Years, in LIBER AMICORUM FOR THE RT.HON. LORD
WILBERFORCE 149, 179-80 (Maarten Bos & Ian Brownlie eds., 1987).
147.
Presumably, there is some relationship, perhaps even a close one,
between the relative frequency with which parties agree to the use of an
institution's rules in their arbitration agreement and the relative frequency with
which disputes are arbitrated under those institutional rules. In other words, the
more often parties identify the ICC, for example, as the administering institution
in their arbitration agreements, the more often parties will actually arbitrate
before the ICC when disputes arise.
148.
See, e.g., DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 102, at 298 n.19; Dezalay &
Garth, supranote 142, at 28 n.4.
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usages of trade into account in their decision, that the arbitrators
do so may say more about their adherence to the parties'
agreement or to the governing law than whether they believe such
consideration benefits the parties, and thus will get them selected
more often in the future to be an arbitrator. At worst, however,
this will result in some overlap as the evidence is considered.
More troubling is that national laws and the CISG likewise
provide that usages of trade and the parties' dealings should be
considered in resolving contract disputes. 14 9 As a result, an
arbitrator who considers commercial norms may be doing so
because of the very legal requirements that this article is trying to
evaluate. 150
Nonetheless, institutional rules and arbitration
statutes that require arbitrators to consider trade usages do so
regardless of the national law that will govern the dispute, 15 1
which suggests that the requirement is not one that results
simply from national substantive contract laws.
Third, the analysis is complicated because of model
arbitration rules and a model law on international arbitration
promulgated by the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL).' 5 2 The Model Rules and Model Law have
been highly influential. The Model Rules frequently have been
adopted by arbitration institutions, while the Model Law has been
enacted by countries seeking to be arbitral sites, often with
minimal changes from the original text.15 3 Part IV of this article
will discuss the effect of the Model Rules and the Model Law in
154
more detail.
Fourth, there may be aspects of international transactionssuch as the very existence of differing national legal schemesthat make the use of commercial norms of greater value in that
setting than in purely domestic disputes. 155 Or it may be that

149.
See supra notes 11-49 and accompanying text.
150.
For example, the drafters of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration at one point deleted any reference to trade usages from its
provisions on the ground that, as explained by a leading commentator, it "was
considered . . . redundant . . . since reference to trade usage frequently was
required by the national law applicable to the dispute." HOwARD M. HOLTZMANN &
JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY 772 (1994).
151.
See infra 161-201 and accompanying text.
152.
UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES (1976); UNCITRAL MODEL LAw ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1985).
153.
See infru notes 193-201 and accompanying text.
154. The European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration
also contains a provision addressing trade usages, see infra note 162, which
certainly influenced the adoption of subsequent rules and laws as well.
155.
See E. Loquin, L'application de regles anationales dans l'arbitrage
commercial international, in L'APPORT DE LAw JURISPRUDENCE ARBITRALE, LES
DOSSIERS DE L'INSTITUT DU DROIT ET DES PRATIQUES DES AFFAIRES INTERNATIONALES
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international commerce is still in its early stages, and so reliance
on commercial norms is more likely than in more mature national
markets.1 5 6 While these weaknesses do not seem relevant for
evaluating the CISG's reliance on commercial norms, they may
raise some questions about the applicability of this analysis to
the UCC and other national commercial laws that require
consideration of commercial norms in resolving contract disputes.
Despite
these
limitations,
international
commercial
arbitration nonetheless provides a better source of evidence for
evaluating the role of commercial norms in contract dispute
resolution than does trade association arbitration.
The next
section describes what the evidence shows.
IV.

COMMERCIAL NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

This section examines the extent to which the various
institutions and individuals involved in international commercial
arbitration rely on commercial norms in resolving contract
disputes. If reliance on commercial norms provides informational
or other benefits to generalist decisionmakers, then one would
expect to find reliance on such norms of behavior in arbitral
rules, statutes, and awards. In fact, reliance on both codified and
uncodified trade usages is widespread in international
arbitration. Institutional rules and an increasing number of
international arbitration statutes frequently require arbitrators to
consider or rely on trade usages.' 5 7 International arbitrators rely
on uncodified trade usages in deciding contract disputes; they
also rely on principles such as good faith, which often require
reference to trade practices.
Overall, the evidence, which is
subject to several caveats already discussed, 158 indicates a
greater reliance on trade usages in international arbitration than
15 9
Professor Bernstein found in trade association arbitration.

98-99 (1986), translated in Observations [on ICC Award No. 5832], in SIGVARD
JARVIN ET AL., COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS: 1986-1990, at 536 (1994) ("The
needs of international trade give rise... to the creation of a-national rules which,
taking account of the hazards and costs of international commercial operations,
impose co-operation in good faith upon the parties whose scope exceeds that
normally required by national law in internal operations").
156.
Cf Bernstein, Questionable Empirical Basis, supra note 4, at 753 n.173
(noting that in "early days of their operation... these merchant tribunals looked
to custom more often").
157.
See infra notes 161-200 and accompanying text.
158.
See supranotes 146-56 and accompanying text.
159. The evidence available from international commercial arbitration
generally does not permit determining the content of the trade usages at issue.
The rules and statutes merely direct that trade usages be used; they do not
specify what those trade usages are. Published arbitration awards often do not
contain much description of the trade usage at issue. Thus, this article does not
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Arbitral reliance on the parties' prior dealings, however, appears
to be much less common than reliance on trade usages, which is
160
consistent with Professor Bernstein's findings.
A. Commercial Norms in InstitutionalRules
Numerous international arbitration institutions require in
their rules that arbitrators consider usages of trade in deciding
contract disputes. 1 1 For example, Article 17(2) of the 1998
Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce
requires that "[iun all cases, the arbitrator shall take account of
16 2
the provisions of the contract and the relevant trade usages."

address Professor Bernstein's subsequent empirical claim that "usages of trade'
and 'commercial standards,' as those terms are used by the Code, may not
consistently exist, even in relatively close-knit merchant communities."
Bernstein, QuestionableEmpirical Basis, supra note 4, at 715. For responses, see
Gillette, supra note 4, at 710 n.10; Kraus & Walt, supra note 4, at 17-20.
160. See Bernstein, QuestionableEmpiricalBasis, supra note 4, at 715.
161. Domestic arbitration rules generally are silent on the question of trade
usages.

See, e.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION

ASSOCIATION (1999). At least part of the explanation is that domestic arbitration
rules generally do not address the rules of decision for arbitrators. At least in
some countries, commentators have asserted that arbitrators in domestic
arbitrations ordinarily attempt to make equitable rather than legal decisions, and
so may well consider trade practices in making their award. See Paul D.
Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 331,
345:
A Latin phrase sometimes employed to describe the spirit of much
American commercial arbitration is ex aequo et bono-a resolution is
sought that is equitable, minimizes harm to either party, and enables
potential adversaries to maintain a valuable commercial relationship; the
role of such an arbitrator is said in Europe to be that of an amiable
compositeur.
See also Albert Jan van den Berg, The Netherlands, at 23-24, in 3 INTERNATIONAL
COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION (Pieter Sanders & Albert Jan van den Berg eds., 1997) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK] ("In domestic practice, an arbitral tribunal is almost always authorized
by the parties to act as amiable compositeur. The [Netherlands Arbitration
Institute] Rules, therefore, state in Article 45(1) that arbitrators decide as amiable
compositeursunless the parties by agreement instructed them to decide according
to the rules of law.").
162.

RULES OF ARBITRATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,

supra note 8, art. 17(2). The ICC apparently drew the rule from Article VII(l) of
the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, April 21,
1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 349 ('European Convention"), which provides as follows:
The parties shall be free to determine, by agreement, the law to be applied
by the arbitrators to the substance of the dispute. Failing any indication
by the parties as to the applicable law, the arbitrators shall apply the
proper law under the rule of conflict that the arbitrators deem applicable.
In both cases the arbitratorsshall take account of the terms of the contract
and trade usages.
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The International Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association provide that "[i]n arbitrations involving the
application of contracts, the tribunal shall decide in accordance
with the terms of the contract and shall take into account usages
of the trade applicable to the contract." 163
A third large
international arbitration institution, the China International
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), has a
similar rule, which provides: "The arbitration tribunal shall
independently and impartially make its award on the basis of the
facts, in accordance with the law and the terms of the contracts,
with reference to international practices and in compliance with
the principle of fairness and reasonableness."'6 By comparison,
none of the institutional rules studied address prior dealings
between the parties as a basis for decision.
Table I categorizes a number of international arbitration
institutions according to how their rules deal with trade
usages.1 6 5 Of the forty-four arbitral .institutions listed, thirty-two
require arbitrators to "take into account," have "regard to," or
otherwise consider trade usages applicable or relevant to the
dispute. The rules of the remaining twelve institutions are silent
on the matter; they do not require arbitrators to consider trade
usages, but they do not forbid them to do so either.

Id. art. 7(1) (emphasis added). The ICC amended its rules to add the rule on trade
usages in 1975. See Giorgio Sacerdoti, The New Arbitration Rules of ICC and
UNCITRAL, 11 J. WORLD TRADE L. 248, 262 (1977).
163.

INTERNATIONAL

ARBITRATION

RULES

OF

THE

AMERICAN

ARBITRATION

ASSOCIATION, art. 28(2) (1997).
164.
CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION,
ARBITRATION RULES art. 53 (1998).

165. Table 1 does not reflect a random sample of arbitration institutions.
Instead, it collects rules of arbitration institutions that are reprinted in prominent
international arbitration sources or readily available on the Internet. Most of the
"leading" international arbitration institutions are included in the listing, as well
as many others. For sources of the rules, see infra Appendix I.
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Table 1: Institutional Rules on Trade Usages
Rules Requiring Arbitrator to Consider Trade Usages

-American Arbitration Association
-Australian Centre for International
Arbitration*
-British Columbia International
Commercial Arbitration Centre*
-Cairo Regional Centre for
International Commercial
Arbitration*
-Chamber of Commerce and
Industry of the Russian Federation*
-Chamber of Commerce, Industry
and Agriculture of Panama*
-Chicago International Dispute
Resolution Association*
-China International Economic and
Trade Arbitration Commission

(CIETAC)
-Commercial Arbitration &
Mediation Center for the Americas
-CPR Institute for Dispute
Resolution
-Croatian Chamber of Economy*
-Economic and Agricultural
Chambers of the Czech Republic
-Estonian Chamber of Commerce
and Industry
-Federal Economic Chamber

(Vienna)
-G.C.C. Commercial Arbitration
Centre
*Uses UNCITRAL Rule without modification.

-German Institution of Arbitration*
-Hong Kong International
Arbitration Center*
-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce
-Indian Society of Arbitrators
-Institute of Arbitrators & Mediators
Australia*
-Inter-American Commercial
Arbitration Commission*
-International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC)
-Italian Association for Arbitration
-Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for
Arbitration*
-Latvian Chamber of Commerce and
Industry*
-Milan Chamber of National and
International Arbitration
-Ministry of Justice (Thailand),
Arbitration Institute
-Netherlands Arbitration Institute
-Portugese Chamber of Commerce &
Industry
-Spanish Court of Arbitration*
-Vietnam International Arbitration
Center
-World Intellectual Property
Organization
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Table 1: Institutional Rules on Trade Usages
Rules Silent on Trade Usages
-Belgian Centre for Arbitration &

-Korean Commercial Arbitration

Mediation(CEPANI)
-Central Chamber of Commerce of

Board
-London Court of International

Finland
-Chamber of Commerce and
Industry of Geneva

Arbitration
-Singapore International Arbitration
Centre

-Danish Institute of Arbitration
-Euro-Arab Chambers of Commerce
-Institute of Arbitration (Belgium)

-Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
-Zurich Chamber of Commerce

-Japan Commercial Arbitration
Association

Among the institutions with rules requiring arbitrators to
consider trade usages are most of the largest international
arbitral institutions. 16 6 Table 2 lists the number of new requests
for international arbitrations filed in 1992 with various
67
arbitration institutions: 1

Table 2: New Requests for International Arbitrations (1992)
ICC

337

Vienna

70

CIETAC
AAA
Hong Kong

267
252
185

Stockholm
British Columbia
Singapore

63
40
12

LCIA

72 (approx.)

Australia

6

Although these data can be difficult to interpret and are of
uncertain reliability, 168 the numbers are generally consistent with

166.
The size of the arbitration institution is measured in terms of numbers
of new requests for arbitration.
167. The principal source of these numbers is Gillis Wetter, The
Internationalisationof InternationalArbitratiorn Looking Ahead to the Next Ten Years,
in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE LCIA CENTENARY
CONFERENCE 85, 95-100 (Martin Hunter et al. eds., 1995) (reporting requests for
arbitration with AAA, Vancouver, Hong Kong, ICC, Oslo, Stockholm, and Vienna;
the Zurich Chamber of Commerce declined to report any figures). Other sources
are ArbitrationNotes: ACICA 1992 CaseloadHits 380, MEALEY'S INTL ARB. REP., Apr.
1993 (reporting Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration
"handled" six international arbitrations in 1992); Michael J. Moser, China's New
InternationalArbitrationRules, J. INT'L ARB., Sept. 1994, at 5, 6 (reporting 267 new
cases filed with CIETAC in 1992).
Updated data for some institutions are
presented infra notes 169-73.
168.
See DEzALAY & GARTH, supra note 102, at 298 n.19 ("The few published
statistics ... are subject to considerable caution. They mix many small matters
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the perception of these institutions obtained from the
international arbitration literature. That literature suggests that
1 69
the ICC is still the predominant institution in the field.
170
Various Asian arbitration centers, particularly CIETAC,
are
growing rapidly, although CIETAC arbitration is not as well
accepted
internationally. 17 1
The
American
Arbitration
Association has a relatively large international caseload' 7 2 and is
foflowed by (in no particular order) the London Court of
International Arbitration (LCIA), the Federal Economic Chamber
in Vienna, and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. 1 73 Of the
arbitral institutions listed in Table 2, only the LCIA, the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce,
and the Singapore
International Arbitration Centre do not have rules requiring

with the very large ones. The statistics also serve the promotional purpose of
attracting new clients by seeking to persuade them of past successes. We have
called this 'making it by faking it."); Wetter, supranote 167, at 94 n.9:
The ICC Court does not register requests for the appointment of an
arbitrator as a case, but the Court receives less than ten such requests
each year. By contrast, both the Hong Kong International Arbitral Centre
and the SCC Institute register requests for the appointment of an
arbitrator as cases ....
Further, the distinction between domestic and
international arbitrations is neither uniformly observed, nor in fact
registered. For these and other reasons the statistics must be read with
great caution.
169.
The number of new requests for arbitration with the ICC has grown
steadily since 1992, to 352 in 1993, 384 in 1995, and 433 in 1996. ICC INTL Cr.
OFARB. BULL., May 1997, at 6.
170.
Many of the Asian international arbitration centers have grown rapidly
since 1992. CIETAC reported 504 new filings in 1993; subsequent reports from
other sources give the number of new filings at over 800 by 1994. See William K.
Slate II, International Arbitration: Do Institutions Make a Difference?, 31 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 41, 50 (1996); Werner, International Commercial Arbitrators:From
Merchant to Academic to Skilled Professional,supra note 96, at 24 ("With close to
1,000 new cases a year, CIETAC is by far the busiest international arbitration
organization in the world and a real success story"). The Singapore International
Arbitration Center reported 58 new filings in 1995, up from 13 in 1992. See
Lawrence G.S. Boo, Singapore,at 3, in 3 HANDBOOK, supra note 161.
171.
See Carter, supra note 110, at 99 n.2 (CIETAC "reports an even larger
international case load [than the AAA], but many of these apparently are disputes
between Chinese and Hong Kong parties. CIETAC arbitration is not in general use
among non-Chinese parties").
172.
In 1998, the American Arbitration Association reported 430
international case filings, up from 320 in 1997. American Arbitration Association,
AAA's 1998 Case Filings Reach All-YTne High <http://www.adr.org/drt/drt04991.html> (webpage no longer available, copy on file with author).
173. The number of cases filed with the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
was 110 in 1993, 100 in 1994, 97 in 1995, 100 in 1996, 110 in 1997, and 122 in
1998. See Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Statistics
(visited
Jan.
19,
2000)
<http://www.chamber.se/arbitration/english/
institute/statisik.html>. Of the cases filed in 1998, 12 were under the UNCITRAL
Rules, and 11 were ad hoc arbitrations. See id.
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arbitrators to consider trade usages. 174 Even those institutions
may in fact apply such a rule in some of the arbitrations they
administer.
For example, of the ninety-one arbitrations
completed by the LCIA in the fifteen months following April 1992,
ten were administered (at the parties' request) under the
UNCITRAL Rules, which, unlike the LCIA's rules, do contain a
17 5
provision on trade usages.
The precise formulations of the rules on trade usages vary in
important ways. 176
The UNCITRAL Rules and those rules
following the UNCITRAL Rules, although requiring arbitrators to
consider trade usages, make the terms of the contract controlling.
UNCITRAL Rule 33(3) provides that the arbitrators "shall decide
in accordance with the terms of the contract," and merely "take
into account" the applicable trade usages. 177 Even that lesser
role seems greater than the role accorded to uncodified trade
usages by the NGFA arbitrators studied by Professor Bernstein,
who do not decide cases on the basis of trade practices unless
both the contract and codified trade rules are silent. 178 The ICC
Rules, by contrast, apparently treat contract provisions and trade
usages as coequal by stating that the tribunal "shall take
account" of both. 17 9 Among other arbitration institutions with
similar rules are the Italian Association for Arbitration, the Milan
Chamber of National and International Arbitration, and the
Netherlands Arbitration Institute.18 0 Whether these rules are so
applied in practice will be discussed later.' 8 ' On their face,
however, they suggest a very different approach to adjudication

174.
Table 2 does not include either the Chamber of Commerce and
Industry of Geneva or the Zurich Chamber of Commerce because no data on case
filings were available for those two institutions. The arbitral rules of both are
silent on trade usages.
175.
See Wetter, supra note 167, at 95.
176.
For other variations, see REISMAN ET AL, supranote 137, at 256-59.
177.
UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, supranote 152, art. 33(3).
178.
See Bernstein, MerchantLaw, supranote 4, at 1777.
179.
See Garavaglia, supra note 32, at 31 n.7, 42; Steven J. Stein & Daniel
R. Wotman, International Commercial Arbitrationin the 1980s: A Comparisonof the
Major Arbitral Systems and Rules, 38 Bus. LAW. 1685, 1714 n.184 (1983). But see
Carlo Croff, The Applicable Law in an International CommercialArbitration:Is It Still
a Conflict of Laws Problem?, 16 INTL LAw. 613, 642 (1982) ("One can find some
stylistic differences [between the UNCITRAL and ICC rules], but they probably do
not differ in the substance").
180.
See Italian Associationfor Arbitration, Rules for InternationalArbitration
art. 22(3), reprintedin 21 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 230, 240 (1996); Milan Chamberof
National and International Arbitration, International Arbitration Rules art. 13,
reprinted in 21 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 247, 255 (1996); Netherlands Arbitration
Institute, ArbitrationRules art. 47, reprintedin 13 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 205, 224
(1988).
181.
See infra notes 202-13 and accompanying text.
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even from that taken by the UCC, which at least nominally
18 2
provides that contract terms prevail over usages of trade.
In addition, the phrase "usage of trade" as used in these
institutional rules is ambiguous. The phrase certainly includes
codified or uncodified commercial practices in various trades and
industries.
Some have suggested, however, that the phrase
"usage of trade" also includes the lex mercatoria, which includes
both international trade customs and general principles of law
applicable to international trade.1 8 3 For the purposes of this
article, the ambiguity is largely immaterial, because under either
reading the arbitrator is directed to consider commercial norms.
It may explain, however, the reluctance of some arbitral
institutions to include a provision addressing trade usages.
These arbitration rules are merely standard contract terms
that the parties can and do incorporate by reference into their
contracts. As such, the parties by agreement can change the
rules, including, if they so desire, any rule requiring arbitrators to
consider trade usages. The available evidence, however, indicates
that they do not do so. In a study of arbitration agreements in
cases administered by the ICC in 1987 and 1989, Stephen Bond
reported no parties modifying in their arbitration agreements the
184
ICC rule on trade usages.

182.
See supranote 26 and accompanying text.
183.
See Emmanuel Gaillard, The UNCIFRAL Model Law and Recent Statutes on
IntenationalArbitration in Europe and North America, 2 ICSID REV. 424, 434 (1987)
(noting "ambiguity surrounding the 'usages of the trade' concept" and that "[s]ome
authors have argued that the concept encompasses lex mercatoria, i.e., rules of law,
and not only the customary practices of the particular trade in question," but finding
such a view "untenable"); see also Bernard Audit, A National Codifiation of
InternationalCommercialArbitration: Yhe French Decree of May 12, 1981, in RESOLVING
TRANS-NATIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 117, 134 (Thomas E.
Carbonneau ed., 1984) (commercial usage has been said to differ from lex mercatoria
in that it consists of 'practices' rather than rules properly spealdng and is restricted to
a given branch of trade (and sometimes to a given geographic area)"); Charles N.
Brower, ArbitratingAgainst Foreign Governments, 6 J. TRANSNATL L. & POLY 189, 191
(1997) (lex mercatoria, a concept reflected, inter alia, in Article 13(5) of the Rules of
Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, providing
that 'i]n all cases the arbitrator shall take account of the provisions of the contract
and the relevant trade usages' ) (alteration in original); Croff, supra note 179, at 641
(referring to the "inclusion of lex mercatoria" in Article VII of the European Convention
requiring arbitrators to "take account of... trade usages"); DiMatteo, supra note 45,
at 146 ("A strong argument can be made that good faith is a universal trade usage or

custom.').
184.
See Stephen R. Bond, How to Draft an ArbitrationClause (Revisited), ICC
INTIL Cr. OF ARB. BULL., Dec. 1990, at 14, 19, 21 (examining arbitration clauses in
237 arbitration cases submitted to ICC Court of Arbitration in 1987 and 215
submitted in 1989; none apparently changed rule on trade usages).
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B. Commercial Norms in ArbitrationStatutes
Prior to 1985, provisions in national arbitration statutes
addressing the role of trade usages in resolving commercial
disputes were rare.1 8s Article 1496 of the 1981 French Code of
Civil Procedure provided that, in international arbitrations, "[t]he
arbitrator shall decide the dispute according to the rules of law
chosen by the parties; in the absence of such a choice, he shall
decide according to the rules he deems appropriate. In all cases,
he shall take into account trade usages."' 8 6 Article 12 of the
Djiboutian Code on international arbitration, adopted in 1984,
contains similar language. I8 7 The vast majority of national laws
on arbitration were silent on the issue.
Since 1985, however, that has changed dramatically.
Beginning with the Netherlands Arbitration Act of 1986, twentyeight countries have revised their arbitration laws to include
provisions requiring arbitrators to consider trade usages. As
shown in Table 3, twenty-nine of the fifty-eight arbitration
statutes currently reported in the International Handbook on
Commercial Arbitration contain such provisions.' 8 8 Moreover, of
the thirty-nine statutes revised after 1985, twenty-eight now
require arbitrators to consider trade usages. The majority of
arbitral statutes (eighteen of twenty-nine) that are silent on trade
usages were revised prior to 1986.389

185.

See Yves Derains, Possible Conflict of Laws Rules and the Rules

Applicable to the Substance of the Dispute, in INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, UNCITRAL's PROJECT FOR A MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 169, 174 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1984) (citing as the only
two examples the French and Dijbouti laws discussed in the text); see also
European Convention, supranote 162. Derains explains that "[t]he reason for this
silence probably lies in the fact that the national laws have for a long time ignored
the specific character of international arbitration and have refrained from
recognizing it." Derains, supra, at 174.
186. The Arbitration Law of France, art. 1496, reprinted in 7 Y.B.
COMMERCIAL ARB. 271, 280 (1982).
187.
See Derains, supranote 185, at 174 ("In all cases, the arbitrators shall
take into account contractual provisions and shall apply international trade
usages").
188.
See infra Appendix II.
189. At least one of those countries, South Africa, is considering enactment
of the UNCITRAL Model Law. See South African Law Comm'n, Report on an
International Arbitration Act for South Africa (July 1998) <http://www.law.wits.
ac.za/salc/report/arbitration.pdf>
(recommending that South Africa enact
UNCITRAL Model Law).
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Table 3: Arbitration Statutes on Trade Usages
Requires Consideration
of Trade Usages
(Non-UNCITRAL)

Follows UNCITRAL Model
Law (1985)

France (1981)

The Netherlands (1986)

Canada (1986)
Cyprus (1987)

Silent on Trade Usages

Japan (1890)
Greece (1971)
Denmark (1972)
Korea (1973)
Israel (1974)
South Africa (1978)
Libya (1980)
Malaysia (1980)
Norway (1980)
Argentina (1981)
Indonesia (1981)
Luxembourg (1981)
Sweden (1981)
Turkey (1982)
Austria (1983)
Saudi Arabia (1983)
Poland (1984)
Belgium (1985)
Portugal (1986)
Switzerland (1987)

Thailand (1987)
Nigeria (1988)
Australia (1989)
Scotland (1990)

Romania (1993)

China (1994)*
Italy (1994)

Peru (1992)
Bermuda (1993)
Bulgaria (1993)
Mexico (1993)
Russian Federation (1993)
Tunisia (1993)
Bahrain (1994)
Egypt (1994)
Hungary (1994)
Singapore (1994)
Ukraine (1994)
Kenya (1995)
India (1996)
Malta (1996)
New Zealand (1996)
Zimbabwe (1996)
Hong Kong (1997)
Germany (1998)
Ireland (1998)

Spain (1988)
United States (1990)
Colombia (1991)
Finland (1992)

Czech Republic (1994)

Sri Lanka (1995)**
England (1996)
Brazil (1996) ***

*Requires disputes be resolved in "equitable and reasonable manner."
** Adopts UNCITRAL Model Law but changes trade usage provision.
Requires parties to agree.
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There are at least two possible reasons for this change. First,
competition among countries to serve as arbitral sites has
accelerated. 190 Increasingly countries are adopting specialized
international arbitration statutes to replace their previous
statutes that, while applying to international arbitrations, were
designed principally for domestic arbitrations. 19 1 It may be that
this interjurisdictional competition has resulted in states
adopting arbitration statutes that include provisions requiring
arbitrators to consider trade usages. If so, that many, although
certainly not all, of the new arbitration statutes contain such
provisions supports the thesis of this article.
Second, in 1985 UNCITRAL promulgated its Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, which significantly reduced
the cost to countries of updating their arbitration statutes. Of the
twenty-nine arbitration statutes listed in Table 3 as requiring
arbitrators to consider trade usages, twenty-four are considered
by UNCITRAL to have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law, with
some slight variations. Those countries that have adopted the
UNCITRAL Model law generally have been countries without a
significant history of serving as an international arbitration
site.' 9 2 This suggests that the ease of adoption played an
important role in those countries' decisions to adopt the Model
Law. It also counsels against drawing overly strong conclusions
from inclusion in national arbitration statutes of a rule on trade
usages.
The text of the arbitration statutes concerning trade usages
varies in much the same way as the wording of arbitration rules
does, as discussed earlier. 193
Article 28(4) of the UNCITRAL
Model Law tracks the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: the arbitrator
"shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and
shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the
transaction." 19 4 Almost all of the countries that based their
arbitration statutes on the UNCITRAL Model Law track this
language. One exception is Egypt, whose statute requires the
arbitrator to "decide in accordance" with both the contract and

190.
See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 102, at 6.
191.
See infra Appendix II.
192.
See De Ly, supra note 119, at 49 ("To a large extent, the Model Law is
used by countries which have little tradition in the field of international
commercial arbitration. The Model Law thus seems to fall back on its original
purpose, to provide a tool for easy introduction or modernization of arbitration law
193.
See supranotes 176-82 and accompanying text.
194. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
supra note 152, art. 28(4).

2000]

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

the trade usages. 195 The Italian statute likewise seems to put
contract language and trade usages on the same level. 196 The
statutes of France and the Netherlands address only trade usages7
19
and require arbitrators to take them into account in all cases.
Sri Lanka modified the provision of the UNCITRAL Model Law to
provide that "[t]he arbitral tribunal shall decide according to
considerations of general justice and fairness or trade usages
only if the parties have expressly authorised it do so." 198 Sri
Lanka seems to have interpreted the Model Law as adopting a
broad view of the meaning of trade usages (as incorporating the
lex mercatora) rather than a narrow one (of incorporating
business practices). 199 Other countries, such as England, whose
new statutes were influenced by the Model Law but do not
include the provision on trade usages, seem to have had similar
20 0
concerns.
At best, the provisions of national arbitration laws provide
uncertain support for using commercial norms to decide contract
disputes. Many national laws require to varying degrees that
arbitrators consider trade usages, but that requirement is by no
means universal and certainly has been influenced by the
UNCITRAL Model Law. None of the statutes contain any similar
provision dealing with course of performance or course of dealing.
C. Commercial Norms in ArbitralAwards
International arbitrators likewise rely on commercial norms
in making their awards.
Although arbitrators often give
precedence to contract provisions, in general they take a much
less formalistic approach to adjudication than the trade
association arbitrators examined by Professor Bernstein. This

195.
Law No. 27 for 1994 Promulgating the Law Concerning Arbitration in
Civil and Commercial Matters (Egypt), art. 39(3), reprinted in 2 HANDBOOK, supra
note 161, at Egypt: Annex 1-11.
196.
See CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE [C.P.c.] art. 834, reprinted in 2
HANDBOOK, supranote 161, at Italy: Annex 1-8.
197.
See CODE CIVIL [C.cFV.] art. 1496, reprintedin 2 HANDBOOK, supra note
161, at France: Annex 1-9; Code of Civil Procedure art. 1054(4), reprinted in 3
HANDBOOK, supra note 161, at The Netherlands: Annex 1-9. De Ly adds that "[tlhe
explanatory report to the [Dutch] arbitration bill confirmed explicitly that
arbitrators in international cases may apply the lex mercatoria,provided that they
have been authorized by the parties or failing choice of law by the parties." DE LY,
supra note 16, at 250. This discussion refers not to the trade usages provision in
the Dutch statute but to other provisions of the same article.
198.
See Arbitration Act, No. 11 of 1995 art. 24(4), reprintedin 3 HANDBOOK,
supranote 161, at Sri Lanka. Annex 1-7.
199.
See supranote 183 and accompanying text.
200.
See Stewart R. Schackleton, The Applicable Law in International
Arbitration Under the New English ArbitrationAct 1996, 13 ARB. INT'L 375, 384-85

(1997).
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section relies on two main sources for its conclusions. The first is
in international
by participants
reports
impressionistic
arbitration proceedings (counsel and arbitrators) as to how
international arbitrators decide cases. The second is arbitration
Only a small, non-random sample of
awards themselves.
arbitration awards are actually published, however, and most of
In addition, those
these awards are from ICC arbitrations.
awards are published only in a heavily edited form, such that it is
difficult to tell how or to what extent the arbitrators actually
20
relied on commercial norms in justifying their awards. ' Thus, it
is not possible to do the sort of all-inclusive examination of
arbitration awards done by Professor Bernstein in her study of
NGFA awards. Nonetheless, some general conclusions can be
drawn from this evidence.
1. Trade Usages and Express Terms
Arbitrators in ICC arbitrations regularly cite to the ICC rule
which requires that "[i]n all cases, the
on trade usages, 2
Arbitral Tribunal shall take account of the provisions of the
contract and the relevant trade usages."20 3 As the arbitrator in
ICC Award No. 4237 stated after citing the French arbitration
statute and the ICC Rules, "[iut goes without saying that the
Arbitrator shall have regard to [the terms of the contract and the
not deviate from the
trade usages] to the extent that they - do
4
law."
applicable
the
of
rules
mandatory

201.
A further difficulty is that the stated reasons for the award may not be
the actual reasons. See Bernstein, MerchantLaw, supra note 4, at 1776 n.37.
202.
See, e.g., ICC Interim Award in Case No. 5314 of 1988, 20 Y.B.
COMMERCIAL ARB. 35, 36, 39 (1995); ICC Final Award in Case No. 6527 of 1991, 18
Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 44, 46 (1993); ICC Final Award in Case No. 5713 of 1989,
15 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 70, 71 (1990); ICC Final Award in Case No. 5485 of 18
Aug. 1987, 14 Y.B. COMMERCIALARB. 156, 161 (1989); ICC Award of Feb. 17, 1984,
Case No. 4237, 10 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 52, 55 (1985); ICC Award of 1982, No.
2930, 9 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 105, 105 (1984); ICC Award of Feb. 16, 1983, No.
3493, 9 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 111, 117 (1984); ICC Award Made Oct. 3, 1980,
Case No. 3540, 7 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 124, 128-29 (1982); ICC Award Made Nov.
29, 1980, Case No. 3380, 7 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 116, 119 (1982).
RULES OF ARBITRATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
203.
supranote 8, art. 17(2).
204.
ICC Award of Feb. 17, 1984, Case No. 4237, 10 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB.
52, 55 (1985); see also Harold J. Berman & Felix J. Dasser, The "New" Law
Merchant and the 'Old": Sources, Content, and Legitimacy, in LEX MERCATORIA AND
ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 53, 65 (Thomas E.
Carbonneau ed., rev. ed. 1998) [hereinafter LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATIONI
("international arbitrators usually do not hesitate to refer to international
commercial custom, including contract practices in international trade, as a basis
of their award").
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Nonetheless, when contract terms are clear, it may be that
international arbitrators give precedence to contract terms over
trade usages despite the wording of the institutional rule. Pieter
Sanders has explained that in his experience in international
arbitrations, "[a]rbitrators will let the contract, if it is clear,
prevail."20 5 As a result, Sanders concludes, the difference in
wording between the ICC rule on trade usages and UNCITRAL
Rule 33(3), which gives greater weight to the contract terms, "[i]n
arbitral practice" may "hardly exist."20 6 Arbitrators certainly
indicate that the parties' contract is controlling, although only
rarely does it seem to matter for the outcome of the
20 7
proceeding.
On the other hand, there is some indication in reported
awards that international arbitrators will disregard express
contract terms in light of trade usages. 20 8 In ICC Award No.

205.
Pieter Sanders, Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2 Y.B.
COMMERCIAL ARB. 172, 211-12 (1977).
206.
Id. at 212; see also ICC Partial Award Rendered in 1986 in Case 4840,
reprinted in JARVIN ET AL., supra note 155 at 465, 472-73 (1993) ("the Tribunal
rules that it will give precedence in this dispute to the rules the parties have
established for their relationship, i.e. the terms of their contracts supplemented
by the relevant trade usage applicable to the matter" (italics omitted)) (Jarvin
commenting that "[t]he arbitrator's decision [in this award] on the applicable law
is in conformity with modem practices in ICC arbitration cases").
207.
See Mobil Oil Iran Inc. v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3, 48 (1987):
ITihe Claimants' references to good faith, trade usage and equity are clear
indications that the present claim is not founded in law...
Good faith
and equity do not necessarily create a duty for the other party which
draws profit from such a situation to agree to amend the initial contract, at
least if the contract as a whole remains profitable to both parties.
See also ICC Award Made in Case No. 2103 in 1972, 3 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 218,
218-19 (1978) (rejecting claim as "contrary to the will of the parties expressed in
the contract . . . and to the customs and practice generally observed in
commercial matters and particularly in international trade relations; stating that
the relevant contract provisions "are perfectly clear and explicit" and therefore
"the unequivocally expressed will of the parties should be respected and.., given
their full and entire scope") (first alteration in original); ICC Final Award in Case
6829 of 1992, 19 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 167, 172 (1994):
Cargo Handling Contract . . . has to be interpreted according to the
relevant law of Luxembourg, the relevant trade usages and the general
principles of law governing such contracts.... [I]t is the Tribunal's view
(and in the end it has also been the parties' view) that the Cargo Handling
Contract has to be interpreted according to its own terms, its language
being the best evidence of the parties' intentions.
(second and third alterations in original).
208.
See ICC Award Made Oct. 23, 1979, in Case No. 3316, 7 Y.B.
COMMERCIAL ARB. 106, 109-10 (1982) (rejecting as unsupported by the evidence
argument that, based on usage in "banldng practice," "the word 'unconditional'
should not be interpreted literally").
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3820, the sole arbitrator looked behind the plain language of the
contract on the basis of the underlying purpose of the provision
and international trade practices. 20 9 A contract for the sale of
food products provided that the buyer would open an irrevocable
letter of credit in favor of the seller. The issuer of the credit,
buyer's bank, agreed that it would authorize payment "provided
goods have been received by opener."2 10 The buyer ultimately
refused to take receipt of the goods, and its bank refused
In an action against the bank, the arbitrator
payment.
"acknowledged that, if read literally, the will of the credit opener
would determine whether the beneficiary would be paid: by
refusing the goods he could ensure that the condition 'goods
But instead the
received by opener' was not fulfilled." 2 1 '
arbitrator interpreted the credit "in accordance with the practices
that apply on this subject in international trade" and rejected the
plain language reading of the credit as "in conflict with the nature
and the purpose of the documentary credit."2 12 The arbitrator
concluded that the phrase "'goods received by opener' also covers
the situation that the opener could have received the goods if he
that is
had wanted to," which gave the language "a significance
2 13
understandable and acceptable in commerce and trade."
2. Trade Usages in Interpretation and Filling Gaps
When the contract is unclear or incomplete, international
arbitrators rely on trade usages in a variety of ways. Arbitrators
frequently consider both codified and uncodified trade usages in
interpreting ambiguous or vague contract terms. 2 14 Arbitrators
rely on codified trade usages in interpreting contract terms even
when the parties have not expressly agreed that the codified
209.

ICC Award Made July 13, 1981, in Case No. 3820, 7 Y.B. COMMERCIAL

ARB. 134 (1982).
210.
Id. at 134.
211.
Id. at 136.
212.
Id. at 135, 136.
213. Id. at 136.
214.
See Karl-Heinz B6ckstiegel, The Legal Rules Applicable in International
Commercial Arbitration Involving States or State-controlled Enterprises, in
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 60 YEARs OF ICC ARBITRATION: A LOOK AT
THE FUTURE 117, 169 (1987) ("[trade customs] are not a separate 'applicable law,'
but have to be taken into consideration by international arbitrators in interpreting
contractual clauses"); JULIAN D.M. LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 466 (1978):
There are few awards which have been totally based on the amorphous
More frequently
standards of commercial usage and trade customs.
customs and usages are looked to as support for an otherwise reached
conclusion (i.e. to show the absence of any genuine conflict) or to facilitate
determining what the parties actually meant in their agreement.
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usages apply, 2 15 and they do not hesitate to rely on uncodified
trade usages when they find those usages helpful. 2 16 Arbitrators
also use trade practices to fill gaps in the parties' written
contract. 2 17 For example, in ICC Final Award No. 4145, the
arbitral tribunal "correct[ed] the Agreement of the parties by
applying trade usages that are relevant" to determine an
appropriate commission rate when changed circumstances
invalidated the rate provided in the contract. 21 8 Arbitrators also
rely on trade usages to evaluate the performance of the parties
under their contract, 2 19 such as in determining whether a party's
performance was reasonable or justified the other party in
2 20
claiming breach.

215. BERGER, supra note 75, at 575 & n. 516 (citing ICC Awards No. 3130
and 3894); Ole Lando, The Law Applicable to the Merits of the Dispute, in ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 124, at 129, 146 n.92 (citing
ICC Awards No. 3894 and 3281). I rely here and elsewhere on English-language
descriptions of ICC awards published only in French.
216.
Mustill, supra note 146, at 157 ("Nobody could deny that usage in [the
sense of a generally followed practice] can be an important element in the
assessment by a tribunal of the rights and duties created by the contract, either
because in a codified or inexplicit form it is tacitly incorporated into the contract");
see Ad Hoc Partial Award on Liability of 12 September 1986, 15 Y.B. COMMERCIAL
ARB. 11, 17 (1990) (looking to "common maritime usage" in interpreting contract
language); ICC Preliminary Award in Case No. 5505 of 1987, 13 Y.B. COMMERCIAL
ARB. 110, 114 (1988) (interpreting choice of law provision by deciding "[h]ow could
that sentence be understood in good faith by a reasonable man active in the
international trade" and looking to parties' usual practice in designating
applicable law); ICC Award Made in Case 2637 in 1975, 2 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB.
153, 154 (1977) (explaining 'common interpretation of trade terms concerning
shipment sales').
217.
See ICC Final Award in Case No. 5485 of 18 Aug. 1987, 14 Y.B.
COMMERCIAL ARB. 156, 172 (1989) (relying on trade usages to determine
amaximum distributable dividend" when contract was silent); Ad Hoc Award of
May 29, 1979, 7 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 81, 82 (1982) (arbitrators acting as
amiables compositeurs declined to use trade usage to fill contractual gap when
party failed to prove such a usage existed).
218.
ICC Final Award of 1986 in Case No. 4145, 12 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB.
97, 110 (1987).
219.
See B6ckstiegel, supra note 214, at 169 ("[trade customs] have to be
taken into consideration by international arbitrators in . . . evaluating the
performance of contractual parties"); LEW, supranote 214, at 466 ("In other cases
customs and usages have been used as the applicable standard to certain specific
aspects of a dispute.").
220.
See ICC Final Award in Case No. 6527 of 1991, 18 Y.B. COMMERCIAL
ARB. 44, 47-48 (1993) (relying on "practice" to define a reasonable time for opening
a letter of credit when the contract had no "express stipulation as to the time for.
. opening); ICC Final Award in Case No. 5713 of 1989, 15 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB.
70, 72 (1990) (relying on CISG as 'reflect[ing] the generally recognized usages
regarding the matter of the non-conformity of goods in international sales") (cites
ICC rule on trade usages); ICC Final Award in Case No. 6076 of 1989, 15 Y.B.
COMMERCIAL ARB. 83, 94-95 (1990) (relying on facts "well known within the trade"
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Reliance on trade usages is particularly pronounced in
arbitrations between private parties and foreign governments.
For example, in the Aramco ad hoc arbitration between Saudi
Afabia and Aramco, the arbitrators interpreted the terms of the
oil concession "in their plain, ordinary and usual sense, which is
the sense accepted in the oil industry."2 2 '
Elsewhere in the
award, the tribunal explained that it "cannot overlook the
practices and usage of commerce, known by both Parties at the
time the Agreement was signed, unless it be prepared to content
itself with abstract reasoning and to lose sight of reality and of
the requirements of the oil industry."2 22 Nonetheless, reliance on
trade usage in such arbitrations is weak evidence as to arbitral
practice generally, because of the unusual nature of arbitrations
22 3
between states and private parties.

to evaluate whether resale of product after breach was reasonable); ICC Award No.
2583, 1976, quoted in LEW, supranote 214, at 470:
it suffices to refer to the usages commonly admitted on the question in the
market in most countries and in particular in Libya, to judge whether one
or several serious breaches by the foreman of his essential obligations
justify the Spanish contractor abandoning the shipyard during the course
of his work....
See also ICC Final Award in Case No. 6268 of 18 May 1990, 16 Y.B. COMMERCIAL
ARB. 119, 124 (1991) (looking to "industry practice" in determining whether
alleged agent had authority to enter agreement to arbitrate); ICC Award in Case
No. 4667 of 1984, described in Paul Bowden, L'Interdiction de se Contredire au
Detriment d'Autrui (Estoppel)as a Substantive TransnationalRule in International
Commercial Arbitration, in TRANSNATIONAL RULES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 125, 133 (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 1993) (holding company bound to
contract signed by commercial director, even though beyond director's scope of
authority; tribunal relied on "good faith" and "relevant trade usages").
221.
Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 27 Intl L. Rep.
117, 179 (ad hoc arbitration Aug. 23, 1958).
222.
Id. at 188; see also ICC Final Award in Case No. 3572 of 1982, 14 Y.B.
COMMERCIAL ARB. 111, 116-17 (1989) (declining to apply national law, instead
applying "internationally accepted principles of law governing contractual
relations"; tribunal explained that this "has become common practice in
international arbitrations particularly in the field of oil drilling concessions and
especially to arbitrations located in Switzerland. Indeed, this practice, which
must have been known to the parties, should be regarded as representing their
implicit will."); Mobil Oil Iran Inc. v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 3, 27-28
(1987) (finding oil sale and purchase agreement not governed by national law of
one party and instead applying general principles of international and commercial
law; "[tihis conclusion is in accord with the spirit of Article 29 and with the usages
of trade, as expressed in agreements between States and foreign companies,
notably in the oil industry, and confirmed in several recent arbitral awards')
(citing awards).
223.
It may be that in such arbitrations choice of trade usages and lex
mercatoria as the applicable law should be seen as a pre-commitment device by
which countries seek to reassure their contractual partners against subsequent
changes in national law. Lando, supra note 215, at 143-44 (explaining that
clauses instructing arbitrators to apply the lex mercatoria
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3. Duty of Good Faith
Unlike NGFA arbitrators, international arbitrators frequently
rely on considerations of good faith in resolving contract disputes.
International arbitral tribunals are very willing to apply the good
faith requirements of national laws and to find that a contracting
party has not acted in good faith.2 2 4 Moreover, international
arbitrators frequently state that parties to international contracts
must act in good faith regardless of whether national law imposes
such a requirement. 225 Indeed, a number of commentators have

are often inserted in contracts between a government or government
enterprise on the one hand and a private enterprise on the other. The
government does not wish to submit to the laws of a foreign state. A
private party will not wish to have the contract governed by the laws of the
foreign government since they may be changed to his disadvantage after
the contract is made.)
But see Georges R. Delaume, The Myth of the Lex Mercatoriaand State Contracts, in
LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION, supra note 204, at 111. Cf.Geoffrey P. Miller,
Choice of Law as a Precommitment Device, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999).
224.
See Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration
Final Award of 21 Dec. 1995, 22 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 13, 17-18 (1997) (Egyptian
law); Hamburg Chamber of Commerce Partial Award of 21 March 1996, 22 Y.B.
COMMERCIAL ARB. 35, 42 (1997) (German law) ("The general principle of good faith
also applies to international contracts for the delivery of goods by installments.");
ICC Final Award in Case No. 8362 of 1995, 22 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 164, 168-69
(1997) (New York law); Ad Hoc UNCITRAL Award of 17 November 1994, 21 Y.B.
COMMERCIAL ARB. (1996) 13, 34 ("good faith is among the basic legal principles
common to all Arab countries"); ICC Final Award in Case No. 6283 of 1990, 17
Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 178, 181 (1992) ("the Arbitral Tribunal considers that
defendant did not execute its contractual obligations in good faith and has
therefore breached the Agreement"); ICC Partial Award in Case No. 5073 of 1986,
13 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 53, 65 (1988) ("the good faith that claimant owed to
defendant in the performance of the contract as extended 9 March 1983, obligated
it to provide more ample notice of termination than it in fact did"); ICC Award on
the Merits (of December 29, 1972) Made in Case No. 2114, 5 Y.B. COMMERCIAL
ARB. 189, 190 (1980) ("present dispute is exactly the type of case where good faith
is of utmost importance").
225.
See Ad Hoc Award of April 1982, 8 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 94, 116
(1983) (argument "contradicts both the general principle of good faith and the
fundamental principle pacta sunt servanda, both principles forming the basis of all
contractual relations, particularly in international affairs, and which are
specifically enshrined in international commercial usages and international law");
ICC Partial Award Made (June 14, 1979) in Case No. 3267, 7 Y.B. COMMERCIAL
ARB. 96, 100 (1982) ("the abruptness of this deduction without advance warning
other than a notice sent simultaneously with the making of such deduction does
not appear in keeping with the good faith spirit which should have prevailed in the
performance of the Contract") (arbitrators authorized to act as "amiable
compositeurs'); Arbitral Tribunal of Hamburg Friendly Arbitration Award of
January 15, 1976, 3 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 212, 213 (1978) ("the forementioned
principles are not based on German rules of law, but are rather a consequence of
the principle of good faith in trade. These principles have because of their
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identified a duty of good faith as one of the general principles of
international trade law developed in international arbitration
226
proceedings.
4. The Lex Mercatoria
Some commentators find a "discernable trend in arbitral
practice that supports the proposition that arbitrators, in the
absence of a choice of law by the parties, may apply the so-called
lex mercatoria, without the need to justify this measure by
reference to any national conflict rule."227 As discussed above,
the lex mercatoria-orlaw merchant-incorporates trade usages
as well as general principles of international trade law, depending
on how the phrase is defined. 2 28 A number of published awards
have applied the lex mercatoria as applicable law, even when
parties have not so agreed. 22 9
Some arbitrators find their

character a supra-national validity"); ICC Award Made in Case No. 1784 in 1975,
2 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 150, 150 (1977) ("requirement of good faith which should
govern the determination of the parties' obligations and their fulfillment,
particularly when the agreement involved is an international contract").
226.
See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Rendering Arbitral Awards with Reasons:
The Elaboration of a Common Law of International Transactions, 23 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 579, 590 (1985) ("ICC arbitrators consider the good faith obligation
as part of international commercial usages"); Bernardo M. Cremades, Practitioners'
Notebook The Impact of International Arbitration on the Development of Business
Law, 31 AM. J. COMp. L. 526, 527 (1983) ("Arbitral decision making has developed
good faith as an overriding rule of international contracting); Mustill, supra note
146, at 174 & n.88 (identifying lex mercatoriaas including rule, among others,
that "[a] contract should be performed in good faith); BERGER, supra note 75, at
544 (listing "bona fides" as "one of constituent elements" of lex mercatoria); KLAUS
PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA Annex I at 278
(1998) ("[tjheparties must act in accordance with the standardof good faith andfair
dealing in internationaltrade") (italics in original); CRAIG ET AL., supra note 109, at
624 ('Performance and renegotiation in good faith"); SCHMITTHOFF, supra note 16,
at 47. But see generally Note, GeneralPrinciplesof Law in InternationalCommercial
Arbitration, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1816 (1988) (not mentioning good faith).
For
detailed discussion of other such general principles, see TRANSNATIONAL RULES IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 125, 133 (Emmanuel Gaillard ed. 1993);
BERGER, supra, at Annex I at 278.
227.
OKEZIE CHUKWUMERIJE, CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 130 (1994).
228.
See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 109, at 603, 607-19; see supra note 183
and accompanying text.
229.
See Paris Chamber of Arbitration Award in Case No. 9246 of 8 Mar.
1996, 22 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 28, 31 (1997) ("the arbitral tribunal deems it more
proper to refer to the body of rules of international commerce which have been
developed by practice and affnmed by the national courts (lex mercatoria"); ICC
Interim Award in Case No. 5314 of 1988, 20 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 35, 40 (1995)
("the Arbitral Tribunal decides: 1. The American law generally and the law of the
State of Massachusetts in particular, supplemented if needed by the lex
mercatoria, is the law applicable to the dispute"); Compania Valenciana de
Cementos Portland v. Primary Coal, Inc., ICC Interim Award of 1 September 1988,

20001

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

authority to do so in the trade usage provision of the ICC
Rules. 2 30 The number of reported arbitral awards that address
the lex mercatoria may be misleading, however, in light of the
much larger number of unreported arbitral awards that evidently
231
do not.
Other awards refuse to apply the lex mercatoria absent
agreement of the parties. 23 2 Such agreement is extremely rare.
Stephen Bond's study of the arbitration agreements of parties
involved in ICC arbitrations in 1987 and 1989 found that only a
handful selected "general principles" of law to govern the parties'
dispute and none specified the lex mercatoriato be the basis for
the arbitrators' decision. 2 33 Only three percent of the clauses in
1987 and four percent in 1989 authorized the arbitrators to
2-4
decide in equity (ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeuM.

Instead, a substantial majority of clauses (seventy-five percent in

described in CHUKWUMERIJE, supra note 227, at 131-32 (applying lex nercatoriain
absence of choice of law by parties); ICC Award Made Oct. 3, 1980, Case No.
3540, 7 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 124, 129 (1982) (tribunal, upon careful
consideration, holds that... the application of the 'lex mercatoria'should be used
here") (arbitrators deciding as amiables compositeurs; see also CRAIG ET AL., supra
note 109, at 296 & n.44 (citing ICC Awards No. 1641, 1859, and 3267).
230.
See ICC Interim Award in Case No. 5314 of 1988, 20 Y.B. COMMERCIAL
ARB. 35, 39 (1995)('Whereas, on the other hand, Art. 13(5) of the ICC rules obliges
the arbitrators to take account of the relevant trade usages. Whereas the lex
mercatoria takes its source in the trade usages and in the principles generally
applicable in international trade." (citation omitted)); id. at 40 (tribunal decides
that applicable law shall be 'supplemented if needed by the lex rnercatorid');ICC
Award Made Nov. 29, 1980, Case No. 3380, 7 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 116, 119
(1982) ('It is not excluded that these general principles [of law and justice under
the contract] are, partly, the same as the 'trade usages,' which arbitrators have to
take into account anyway, according to" the ICC Rules).
231.
See CRAIG ET AL., supranote 109, at 300 n.58 ('by comparison with the
number of cases submitted to (ICC) arbitration lex mercatoria appears only rarely
.. one should not come away with the impression that most ICC arbitrations, or
even a large proportion of them, refer to lex mercatoria") (quoting then-General
Counsel of ICC in 1986); see also DEZALAY & GARTH, supranote 102, at 41-42
(describing 'polarization between academics and practitioners" over concepts such
as lex mercatoria).
232.
See ICC Interim Award in Case No. 6149 of 1990, 20 Y.B. COMMERCIAL
ARB. 41, 56-57 (1995); ICC Interim Award of 1985 in Case No. 4650, 12 Y.B.
COMMERCIALARB. 111, 112 (1987).
233.
See Bond, supra note 184, at 19; see also Barton S. Selden, Lex
Mercatoria in Europeanand U.S. Trade Practice:Time to Take a CloserLook, 2 ANN.
SURV. INTL & COMP. L. 111, 113-14 (1995) (reporting results of 'extremely
unscientific... survey' of international lawyers):
Virtually every recipient replied that he had not had a client enter into a
contract incorporating lex mercatoria as a choice of law in the past ten
years. Most went on to add that they would strongly advise against such a
provision, if a client were foolish enough to propose it.
234.

See Bond, supra note 184, at 19.
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1987 and sixty-six percent in 1989) identified a particular
23 S
national law as governing the contract.
When arbitrators rely on the lex mercatoria, they readily
consider good faith and similar considerations in making their
decisions. A leading example is the Norsolor award of 1979.236
In Norsolor, the Turkish claimant sought damages for breach of
an agency agreement by the French respondent. The contract did
not provide for a particular national law to govern; accordingly,
the arbitrators "considered that it was appropriate, given the
international nature of the agreement, to leave aside any
compelling reference to a specific legislation, be it Turkish or
French, and to apply the international lex mercatoria."23 7 One
principle that "inspires" the lex mercatoria, according to the
arbitrators, "is that of the good faith which must preside the
formation and the performance of contracts. " 23 8
Because
respondent's conduct "was scarcely compatible with the
maintaining of good commercial relations," the tribunal found it
23 9
liable for breach of contract.
5. Prior Dealings Between the Parties
The evidence on the use of prior dealings in arbitral awards
is much more meager than that on trade usages. Prior dealings
between the parties as the basis for the arbitrator's decision are
rarely discussed in the international arbitration literature. 2 4°
This does not mean that they are irrelevant to the arbitrators'
decisions; it merely means that the subject is of less academic
interest. The ongoing debate on lex mercatoria makes trade
usages highly topical; dealings between the parties are much less
germane to that debate. Nonetheless, the apparent absence of

235.
See id.
236.
Pabalk Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Norsolor S.A., ICC Award of Oct. 26,
1979, No. 3131, 9 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 109 (1984) [hereinafter Norsolorj. The
award ultimately was upheld by the Supreme Court of Austria. See Norsolor S.A.
v. Pabalk Ticaret Ltd. (Oberster Gerichtshof, Nov. 18, 1982), 9 Y.B. COMMERCIAL
ARB. 159 (1984). For another example, see ICC Case No. 2291 (1976), describedin
DE LY, supra note 16, at 263 (according to De Ly, the "tribunal revised freight
tariffs on the basis of the principle of the lex mercatoriaor rebus sic stantibus and
according to which in international commercial transactions a certain contractual
balance should exist between the mutual obligations of the parties").
237.
Norsolor, supranote 236, at 110.
238.
Id.
239.
Id. at 111.
240.
For one exception, see Alexsandar Goldgtajn, Usages of Trade and
Other Autonomous Rules of International Trade According to the UN (1980) Sales
Convention, in INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: DUBROVNIK LECTURES 55, 99 (Petar

Sardevid & Paul Volken eds., 1986) (listing "hierarchical ranks of the sources of lax
mercatorid" as the contract followed by "the practice established between the
contracting parties").
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such discussions in publications by arbitrators and academics is
noteworthy.
On occasion, arbitral tribunals will rely on prior dealings or
conduct of the parties in resolving contract disputes. The most
frequent reported use of parties' conduct has been by the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal, 24 1 which has relied on prior
conduct in deciding issues of contract interpretation,
performance, and waiver.2 4 2 The Tribunal was established by
agreement of the governments of Iran and the United States 2s

241.
Jacomijn J. van Hof states that although the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
has considered codified trade practices in its awards, "there are no cases where
(trade specific) uncodified customs and usages were applied." JACOMIJN J. VAN
HOF, COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES: THE APPLICATION BY THE
IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 268-69 (1991). This seems to be somewhat of an
overstatement. See Lockheed Corp. v. Iran, 18 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 292, 316
(1988):
In such transactions, a seller's risk of loss or damage to goods customarily
does not extend beyond the point at which its liability for transportation or
insurance costs ceases. The Tribunal has no reason to believe, and the
IAF has not asserted, that Lockheed accepted any greater risk of loss here.
See also Anaconda-Iran, Inc. v. Iran, 13 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 199, 233 (1986)
(requiring parties to "brief in their future pleadings ... the relevant usages of the
trade in respect of contractual limitations of remedies similar to the provisions
contained in Article 9 of the TAA"); General Dynamics Corp. v. Iran, 5 Iran-U.S.
Cl. Trib. Rep. 386, 394 (1984) (contract did not require Navy to pay customs
broker fee and "[t]he Tribunal is not satisfied that under the circumstances of the
transaction the Navy would be liable for such costs pursuant to trade usage").
242.

See GEORGE H. ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES

CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 286-92 (1996) (describing awards); see also Uiterwyk Corp. v.
Iran, 19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 106, 122 (1988) (finding agency relationship "in
which the respective roles of the parties were evidenced by long and consistent
practice"); First Travel Corp. v. Iran, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 360, 367, 368
(1985) ("Tribunal can have recourse to a number of. . . aids to interpretation
where the plain terms of the contract are inconclusive," including trade usage and
"conduct of the Parties and their subsequent practice"; finding neither source
helpful in this case). For a non-Tribunal example, see Ad Hoc Final Award of 20
Nov. 1987, 14 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 47, 66 (1989) (finding against defendant on
ground that defendant's practice on contract at issue was "contrary to the
defendant's practice on other contracts").
243.
See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria (Jan. 19, 1981), and Declaration of the Government and
Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the
Government of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Jan.
19, 1981) ('Claims Settlement Declaration"), reprinted in ALDRICH, supra note 242,
at Annex I at 541-49. Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration provides:
"The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law, applying such
choice of law rules and principles of commercial and international law as the
Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking into account relevant usages of the
trade, contract provisions and changed circumstances."
Id. at 547.
For
discussion of choice of law issues generally before the Tribunal, see John R.
Crook, Applicable Law in International Arbitration: The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
Experience, 83 AM. J. INTL L. 278 (1989).
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and is not the product of the market competition described
previously. 2 44 Nonetheless, a number of the arbitrators at the
Tribunal participated in international commercial arbitrations
both before serving at the Tribunal and after. Given that all
Tribunal awards are published, one would expect that concerns
about their reputations as prospective arbitrators would induce
at least those arbitrators considering a return to private practice
to decide cases at the Tribunal so as to signal how they would
decide cases thereafter.
Overall, this evidence is based on a non-random sample of
awards and other sources and is subject to a number of caveats
discussed previously.2 45
Nonetheless, the available evidence
suggests that the sort of formalistic decisionmaking found by
Professor Bernstein in NGFA arbitrations is not the usual practice
in international commercial arbitration. International arbitrators
appear to rely to a significant degree on trade usages in resolving
contract disputes; however, they rely only to a much lesser degree
on the parties' prior dealings. 24 6
V.

CONCLUSION

This article has examined the role of commercial norms-as
reflected in trade usages and the parties' prior dealings-in
resolving contract disputes in international commercial
arbitration. Reliance on commercial norms has costs: it restricts
the ability of contracting parties to allocate part of their
agreement to extra-legal means of enforcement. Yet it also has
benefits, particularly for generalist decisionmakers for whom
commercial norms provide necessary information about the
parties' agreement. International commercial arbitration provides
a useful source of evidence to help in resolving the empirical

244.
See supra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
245.
I did not include arbitration awards from countries with non-market
economies when the arbitrators were not subject to the competition described
previously. See LEW, supra note 214, at 28-29 (senior officials in chambers of
commerce in socialist countries were 'appointed by the Ministry of Foreign
Trade"); see also supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text. Even so, those
arbitration tribunals did at least make "references" to usage and custom, see LEw,
supra note 214, at 472-74, as well as prior dealings between the parties, see
Court of Arbitration of Chamber of Foreign Trade of the German Democratic
Republic Award of May 26, 1982, 9 Y.B. COMMERcIALARB. 103, 103 (1984).
246. The lesser reliance on the parties' prior dealings as compared to trade
usages may be due to greater costs and perhaps smaller benefits of such reliance.
The parties' prior dealings will more likely reflect relational aspects of their deal
than usages of the trade; giving legal sanction to prior dealings thus may be more
likely to impose costs of the sorts identified by Professor Bernstein. Conversely,
the parties' prior dealings may provide less information about the parties'

agreement than trade usages, although the UCC seems to assume otherwise. See
UCC § 2-208 & cmt. 1.
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question of whether the costs outweigh these benefits, because it
is consensual, resembles adjudication in public courts in
important ways, and is a highly competitive business.
International arbitration rules and statutes frequently direct
arbitrators to consider trade usages; some statutes and rules
even seem to give trade usages the same weight as the express
terms of the parties' contract. International arbitrators likewise
readily consider trade usages in resolving contract disputes,
assisting them in interpreting contract provisions, filling gaps in
the contract, evaluating the parties' performance, and sometimes
even in altering seemingly clear contract language. International
arbitrators also commonly evaluate whether a contracting party
has acted in good faith or in a reasonable manner, which often
may require a resort to trade practices. By contrast, arbitral
rules and statutes never address the role that prior dealings
between the parties should play in an arbitrator's decision, and
published arbitral awards only infrequently consider prior
dealings in resolving contract disputes. Overall, the evidence
presented here, while largely impressionistic, provides at least
some support for the incorporation of commercial norms-as
reflected in trade usages but not in the parties' prior dealingsinto commercial laws such as the CISG and the UCC.
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APPENDIX I:

International Arbitration Rules on Trade Usages
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976)
See art. 33(3), reprintedin REISMAm ET AL. 623, 639:

"In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with
the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of
the trade applicable to the transaction."
American Arbitration Association (AAA) (1997)
See art. 28(2), reprintedin REISMAN ET AL. 493, 508:

"In arbitrations involving the application of contracts, the tribunal
shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall
take into account usages of the trade applicable to the contract."
Australian Centre for International Arbitration
Adopts UNCITRAL Rules. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (visited Jan. 4,
2000) <http://www.acica-com.au/rules.htm>.
Belgian Centre for Arbitration & Mediation (CEPANI)
No provision. See Belgian Centrefor Arbitrationand Mediation (visited Jan. 4,
2000) <http://www.cepani.be/ english.html>.
British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration Centre
Follows UNCITRAL Rules. See BCICAC Rules, art. 30(5) (visited Jan. 4,
2000) <http://www.bcicac.com/cfm/index.cfm?L=91&P=99>.
Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration
(CRCICA)
Follows UNCITRAL Rules. See CRCICA Rules, art. 33(3) (last modified Mar.
.11, 1998) <http://www.crcica.org.eg/crcica98.htm4#ArbitrationRules>.
Central Chamber of Commerce of Finland
No provision. See Rules of the Board of Arbitrationof the Central Chamber of
Commerce of Finland (last modified Aug. 28, 1999) <http://www.keskuskaup
pakamari.fi/laldasiat/vla-ules.html>.
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Geneva (CCIG)
No provision. See Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Geneva (CCIG)
Arbitration Rules (1992), reprintedin 18 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 195 (1993).

Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation
Follows UNCITRAL Rules. See International Commercial Arbitration Court
at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation, Arbitration
Rules § 13(1) (1995), reprintedin 21 Y.B. COMMERcIALARB. 265, 270 (1996).

Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture of Panama
Follows UNCITRAL Rules. See Center for Conciliation and Arbitration of the
Chamberof Commerce, Industry and Agriculture of Panama, art. 58(2), reprintedin
4A WORLD ARB. REP. 5034, 5051:
"The arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of
the contract and shall take into account commercial usages
applicable to the case."

20001

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

Chicago International Dispute Resolution Association (CIDRA)
Follows UNCITRAL Rules. See The ArbitrationRules of CIDRA, art. 32(3) (last
modified July 20, 1999) <http://www.cidra.org/rules.html#32>.
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission
(CIETAC)
See ChinaInternationalEconomic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration
Rules, art.
53
(1998)
<http://sunflower.singnet.com.sg/-arbiter/cietez.
htm#tc60>:
'The arbitration tribunal shall independently and impartially make
its arbitral award on the basis of the facts, in accordance with the
law and the terms of the contracts, with reference to international
practices and in compliance with the principle of fairness and
reasonableness."
Commercial Arbitration and Mediation Center for the Americas
See Mediation and Arbitration Rules, art. 30(2), reprinted in 22 Y.B.
COMMERCIALARB. 320, 340 (1997):
'In arbitrations involving the application of contracts, the tribunal
shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall
take into account usages of the trade applicable to the contract."
CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution
See rule 10, reprintedin REISMAN ET AL. 676, 687:
"10.1 The Tribunal shall apply the substantive law designated by
the parties as applicable to the dispute. Failing such a designation
by the parties, the Tribunal shall apply such law or laws as it
determines to be appropriate."
"10.2
Subject to Rule 10.1, in arbitrations involving the
application of contracts, the Tribunal shall decide in accordance
with the terms of the contract and shall take into account usages of
the trade applicable to the contract."
Croatian Chamber of Economy
Follows UNCITRAL Rules. See Zagreb Rules, art. 38(3) (effective May 7, 1992)
<http://www.hgk.hr/komora/sud/rules.htm#Start>.
Danish Institute of Arbitration
No provision. See Rules of Procedure of the Danish Institute of Arbritation
(visited Jan. 24, 2000) <http://www.denarbitra.dk/rulesp.html>).
Economic and Agricultural Chambers of the Czech Republic
See The Rules, § 8(l) (visited Jan. 4, 2000) <http:www.arbcourt.cz/
E jndex.htm>:
'The Arbitration Court shall decide disputes in accordance with the
rules of the applicable material law, guiding themselves, within the
scope thereof, by the contract concluded between the parties and
having regard to the custom of trade."
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Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
See Rules of the Arbitration Court of the Estonian Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, art. 16 (modified Oct. 20, 1998) <http://www.koda.ee>:
"In settling a dispute the actions of the Arbitration Court shall be
guided by the provisions of substantive law, the terms of the
contract, common practice and the present regulations."
Euro-Arab Chambers of Commerce
No provision. See Rules of Conciliation,Arbitrationand Expertise, reprinted in
11 Y.B. COMMERcIAL ARB. 228 (1986).
Federal Economic Chamber (Vienna)
See The New Rules of Arbitrationand Conciliationof the International Arbitral
Centre of the FederalEconomic Chamber Vienna (Vienna Rules), art. 16(1), reprinted
in 18 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 206, 214 (1993):
"In any case, the arbitrators shall observe the contract and the
usages of trade applicable to the transaction."
G.C.C. Commercial Arbitration Centre
See Arbitral Rules of Procedure, art. 28(4) (last modified Oct. 23, 1998)
<http://www.gccarbitration.com>:
"The tribunal shall settle disputes in accordance with the following:
1. The contract concluded between the two parties as well as
any subsequent agreement between them.
2. The law chosen by the parties.
3. The law having most relevance to the issue of the dispute in
accordance with the rules of the conflict of laws deemed fit by the
Tribunal.
4.
Local and international business practices."
German Institution of Arbitration
Follows UNCITRAL Rules. See ArbitrationRules, § 23.4 (visited Jan. 4, 2000)
<http://www.dis-arb.de>.
Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre
Recommends UNCITRAL Rules. See Recommended Mediation and Arbitration
Clauses (last modified Aug. 20, 1999) <http://www.hldac.org/services.htm>.
Hungarian Chamber of Commerce
See Rules of Procedures of the Court of Arbitration, art. 13(4), reprintedin 20
Y.B. COMMERCIALARB. 295, 301 (1995):

"In each case, the arbitral tribunal makes its decisions in
compliance with the stipulations of the contract and by taking into
consideration applicable commercial customs."
Indian Society of Arbitrators
See Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation of Indian Society of Arbitrators, New
Delhi, art. 13.5 (visited Jan. 4, 2000) <http://www.singhania.com/ca/
appen..203. html>:
"In all cases the arbitrator shall take account of the provisions of
the contract and the relevant trade usages."
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Institute of Arbitrators & Mediators Australia
Adopts UNCITRAL Rules.
See Rules for the Conduct of Commercial
Arbitration, rule 20 (visited Jan. 4, 2000) <http://www.instarb.com.au/rules.
htm>.
Institute of Arbitration (Belgium)
No provision. See <http://www.eco.be/institut/regleng.htm> (webpage no
longer available, copy on file with author).
Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission (IACAV)
See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration
Commission, art. 33(3) (1982), reprintedin REISMAN ET AL. 585, 603:
'In all cases the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with
the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of
the trade applicable to the transaction."
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
See Rules of Arbitration, art. 17(2) (1998), reprintedin CRAIG ET AL. 111:
'In all cases, the Arbitral Tribunal shall take account of the
provisions of the contract and the relevant trade usages."
Italian Association for Arbitration
See Rules for International Arbitration, art. 22(3),
COMMERCIALARB. 230, 240 (1996):

reprinted in 21 Y.B.

"Inall cases, the arbitrator shall take into account the provisions of
the contract and the customs concerning the matter in dispute."
Japan Commercial ArbitrationAssociation (JCAA)
No provision. See 20 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 285 (1995).
Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB)
No provision. See Commercial Arbitration Rules of KCAB (visited Jan. 4,
2000) <http://www.kcab.org/e/kcab2.html>.
Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration
Adopts UNCITRAL Rules. See Rules for Arbitration, rule 1(1) (visited Jan. 4,
2000) <http://www.klrca.org/rules/index.html>.
Latvian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Adopts UNCITRAL Rules.
See Arbitration (visited Jan.
<http://sun.cc.org.lv/Chamber-pages/arbitration.html>.

4,

2000)

London Court of International Arbitration
No provision. See <http://www.Icia-arbitration.com/town/square/xvc24/
rulecost/english.htm>.
Milan Chamber of National and International Arbitration
See International ArbitrationRules, art. 13, reprinted in 21 Y.B. COMMERCIAL
ARB. 247, 255 (1996):
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"In any case the arbitrator shall take into account the provisions of
the contract and trade usages."
Ministry of Justice (Thailand), Arbitration Institute
See Arbitration Rules, rule 28 (last modified
<http://www.oja.go.th/Nnidex.htm>:

Dec.

20,

1999)

"The arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with legal principle
and the rule of justice. In the interpretation of contract, the
tribunal shall take into account its enforceability and the usages of
trade applicable to the transaction."
Netherlands Arbitration Institute
See Arbitration Rules, art. 47, reprintedin 13 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 205, 224
(1998):
.In all cases the arbitral tribunal shall take into account any
applicable trade usages."
Portuguese Chamber of Commerce & Industry
See Rules of the Arbitral Tribuna4 art. 28 (visited Jan. 4,
<http://www.intemationaadr.com/portugall.htm#Arbitral Rules>:

2000)

"The tribunal shall always, in the award, take in consideration the
trade usage."
Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC):
No provision. See Arbitration Rules (last modified July 21, 1999) <http://
siac.tdb.gov.sg/rules.html.
Spanish Court of Arbitration
Adopts UNCITRAL Rules. See Working Statutes of the Spanish Court of
Arbitration, art. 3, in 4A WORLD ARB. REP. 5279, 5280 (1982).
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
No provision. See Rules of the ArbitrationInstitute of the Stockholm Chamber
of Commerce (1999) (visited Jan. 24, 2000) <http://www.chamber.se/arbitration/
english/rules/scc_ rulescont.html>.
Vietnam International Arbitration Centre (VIAC)
See ArbitrationRules, art. 23, reprintedin 21 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB. 288, 293
(1996):
"The arbitral tribunal or the sole arbitrator, as the case may be,
shall settle the dispute on the strength of the terms and conditions
of the original contract, if the dispute arise from relations
thereunder, in accordance with the law applicable to it and with
any related international treaty, taking into account the trade
usages and international practice."
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
See WIPO Arbitration Rules, art. 59(a), reprintedin 20 Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB.
340, 361 (1995):
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'In all cases, the Tribunal shall decide having due regard to the
terms of any relevant contract and taking into account applicable
trade usages.'
Zurich Chamber of Commerce
No provision. See International Arbitration Rules of Zurich Chamber of
Commerce (visited Jan. 4, 2000) <http://www.zurichcci.ch/>.
Sources: The sources for the rules are as follows: W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL.,
DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES
MATERIALS AND NOTES ON THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES
(1997) (REISMAN ET AL.); YEARBOOK OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Y.B. COMMERCIAL
ARB.); PARKER SCHOOL OF FOREIGN & COMPARATIVE LAW, WORLD ARBITRATION
REPORTER (1997) (WORLD ARB. REP.); W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., ANNOTATED GUIDE
TO THE 1998 ICC ARBITRATION RULES WITH COMMENTARY (1998) (CRAIG ET AL.); and
various Internet sources, as indicated.

140

VANDERBILT JOURVAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 33:79

APPENDIX II:
International Arbitration Statutes on Trade Usages
UNCITRAL Model

Law on International Commercial Arbitration

(1985)
Art. 28(4):
"In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with
the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of
the trade applicable to the transaction."
Argentina (1981)
No provision.
Australia (1989)
Adopts UNCITRAL Model Law. See International Arbitration Act, 1974, §§
15(1), 16(1) (1992) (Austl.), reprintedin I HANDBOOK at Australia: Annex 11-5 to -6.
Austria (1983)
No provision.
Bahrain (1994)
Adopts UNCITRAL Model Law. See Decree Law No. 9 of 1994 with Respect to
Promulgation of International Commercial Arbitration (Bahr.), art. 1, reprintedin 1
HANDBOOK at Bahrain: Annex I-1.
Belgium (1985)
No provision.
Bermuda (1993)
Adopts UNCITRAL Model Law. See The Bermuda International Conciliation
and Arbitration Act 1993, § 23(1) reprintedin 1 HANDBOOK at Bermuda: Annex 1-7.
Brazil (1996)
See Law No. 9.307 of 23 Sept. 1996, art. 2, para. 2 (Braz.), reprinted in 1
HANDBOOK at Brazil: Annex I-i:

"The parties may also agree that the arbitration shall be conducted
under the general principles of law, customs and usages, and
international rules of trade."
Bulgaria (1993)
Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, art. 38(3) (1988), amended by Law Amending the Law on International
Commercial Arbitration (1993) (BuIg.), reprinted in 1 HANDBOOK at Bulgaria:
Annex 1- 6:
"In all cases the arbitral tribunal shall apply the terms of the
contract and shall take into account trade usages."
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Canada (1986)
Federal: Adopts UNCITRAL Model Law. See Commercial Arbitration Act,
R.S.C., ch. C-34.6, § 5(1) (1985) (Can.), reprinted in 1 HANDBOOK at Canada:
Annex 1-2.
Quebec: Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See An Act to Amend the Civil Code
and the Code of Civil Procedure in Respect of Arbitration, S.Q. 1986, ch. 73, art.
944.10 (Can.), reprintedin 1 HANDBOOK at Canada: Annex 111-4:
"[The arbitrators] shall in all cases decide according to the
stipulations of the contract and take account of applicable usage."
British Columbia: Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See British Columbia
International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, ch. 233, § 28(5),
reprintedin I HANDBOOK at Canada: Annex V-10.
Ontario: Adopts UNCITRAL Model Law. See Ontario International
Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch. 1-9, § 2, reprinted in 1 HANDBOOK at
Canada: Annex VII-1.
People's Republic of China (1994)
See Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 7, reprinted in 1
HANDBOOK at P.R. China: Annex II-l:
'In arbitration, disputes shall be resolved on the basis of facts, in
compliance with law and in an equitable and reasonable manner."
Colombia (1991)
No provision.
Cyprus (1987)
Adopts UNCITRAL Model Law. See The International Commercial Arbitration
Law, 1987 (Cyprus), reprinted in 1 HANDBOOK at Cypress: Annex I-1 to -3.
Czech Republic (1994)
No provision.
Denmark (1972)
No provision.
Egypt (1994)
Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See Law No. 27 for 1994 Promulgating the
Law Concerning Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 39(3) (Egypt),
reprintedin 2 HANDBOOK at Egypt: Annex I-11:
*The arbitral panel, when adjudicating the merits of the dispute,
shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract in dispute
and the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction."
England (1996)
No provision.
Finland (1992)
No provision.
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See C.CIV., art. 1496 (Fr.), reprintedin 2

HANDBOOK

[VoL 33:79

at France: Annex 1-9:

"In all cases [the arbitrator] shall take into account trade usages."
Greece (1971)
No provision.
Germany (1998)
Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See § 1051, para. 4 ZPO (F.R.G.), reprintedin
Ftll Text of the New GermanArbitrationLaw in Force as of 1 January 1998, 14 ARB.
INT'L 1, 11 (1998):
"In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with
the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of
the trade applicable to the transaction."

Hong Kong (1997)
Adopts UNCITRAL Model Law. See Arbitration Ordinance, art. 34C(l) (H.K.),
reprintedin 2 HANDBOOK at Hong Kong: Annex 1-27.

Hungary (1994)
Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See Act LXXI of 1994 on Arbitration, § 50
(Hung.), reprintedin 2 HANDBOOK at Hungary: Annex 1-14:
"The arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of
the contract as well as by taking into account the trade practices
applicable to the transaction."

India (1996)
Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See The Arbitration and Conciliation
Ordinance, 1996, No. 8 of 1996, art. 28(3) (India) (identical text), reprinted in 2
HANDBOOK at India: Annex 1-12.

Indonesia (1981)
No provision.

Ireland (1998)
Adopts UNCITRAL Model Law (text unavailable; parliamentary debates do
not indicate any change to UNCITRAL provision on trade usages).

Israel (1974)
No provision.

Italy (1994)
See C.P.c., art. 834 (Italy), reprintedin 2 HANDBOOK at Italy: Annex 1-8:
"In both cases the arbitrators shall take into account
provisions of the contract and trade usages."

Japan (1890)
No provision.

the
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Kenya (1995)
Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See The Arbitration Act, 1995, No. 4 of 1995,
art. 29(5) (Kenya), reprintedin 2 HANDBOOK at Kenya: Annex 1-10:
"In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with
the terms of the particular contract and shall take into account the
usages of the trade applicable to the particular transaction."
Korea (1973)
No provision.
Libya (1980)
No provision.
Luxembourg (1981)
No provision.
Malaysia (1980)
No provision.
Malta (1996)
Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See Arbitration Act 1996, No. I of 1996, art.
45(3) (Malta), reprintedin 3 HANDBOOK at Malta: Annex 1-15:
"In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with
the terms of the contract and shall, if relevant, take into account
the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction."
Mexico (1993)
Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See Decree Containing Amendments and
Diverse Additional Provisions Made to the Commercial Code and the Federal Code
of Civil Procedure, July 22, 1993, art. 1445(4) (Mex.) (similar text), reprinted in 3
HANDBOOK at Mexico: Annex 1-9.
The Netherlands (1986)
See Code of Civil Procedure, art. 1054(4) (Neth.), reprintedin 3 HANDBOOK at
the Netherlands: Annex 1-9:
"In all cases the arbitral tribunal shall take into account any
applicable trade usages.'
New Zealand (1996)
Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See Arbitration Act 1996, art. 28(4) (N.Z.),
reprintedin 3 HANDBOOK at New Zealand: Annex 1-14:
"In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with
the terms of any contract and shall take into account any usages of
the trade applicable to the transaction."
Nigeria (1988)
Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See Arbitration and Conciliation Decree
1988, Decree No. 11, art. 47(5) (Nig.) (similar text), reprinted in 3 HANDBOOK at
Fed. Rep. of Nigeria: Annex 1-14.
Norway (1980)
No provision.
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Peru (1992)
Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See Decree Law No. 25935, art. 103 (Peru),
reprintedin 3 HANDBOOK at Peru: Annex 1-2 1:
'In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with
the terms of the contract and shall take into account, in
commercial matters, the usages of the trade applicable to the
transaction."
Poland (1984)
No provision.

Portugal (1986)
No provision.
Romania (1993)
See Book IV, Code of Civil Procedure, arts. 340-370 on Arbitration (as
amended by Law No. 59 of 23 July 1993), art. 360 (Rom.), reprinted in 3
HANDBOOK at Romania: Annex 1-10:

"The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute on the basis of the
principal contract and the applicable rules of law, taking into
account trade usages, as the case may be."
Russian Federation (1993)
Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See Law of the Russian Federation on
International Commercial Arbitration, art. 28(3) (Russ.) (similar text), reprinted in
3 HANDBOOK at Russian Fed: Annex 1-7.
Saudi Arabia (1983)
No provision.
Scotland (1990)
Adopts UNCITRAL Model Law. See Law Reform (Scotland) Act 1990, § 66(2),
reprintedin 3 HANDBOOK at Scotland: Annex III-1.
Singapore (1994)
Adopts UNCITRAL Model Law. See International Arbitration Act 1994,
Republic of Singapore, No. 23 of 1994, art. 3(1), reprinted in 3 HANDBOOK at
Singapore: Annex I-1.
South Africa (1978)
No provision.
Spain (1988)
No provision.
Sri Lanka (1995)
Follows UNCITRAL Model Law with significant change. See Arbitration Act,
No. 11 of 1995, art. 24(4) (Sri Lanka), reprinted in 3 HANDBOOK at Sri Lanka:
Annex 1-7:
"bhe arbitral tribunal shall decide according to considerations of
general justice and fairness or trade usages only if the parties have
expressly authorised it to do so."
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Sweden (1981)
No provision.
Switzerland (1987)
No provision.
Thailand (1987)
No provision.
Tunisia (1993)
Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See Arbitration Code, art. 73(4) (Tunis.)
(similar text), reprintedin 4 HANDBOOK at Tunisia: Annex 1-9.
Turkey (1982)
No provision.
Ukraine (1994)
Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See Law on Commercial Arbitration, art.
28(4) (Ukr.) (similar text), reprintedin 4 HANDBOOK at Ukraine: Annex 1-9:
United States (1990)
Federal Arbitration Act: No provision.
California: Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1297.285 (West Supp. 1999) (identical text).
Colorado: No provision. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 13-22-502 to -507 (1997).
Connecticut: Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See CONN. GEN. STAT. Ann. §
50a-128(4) (West 1997).
Florida: See FLA. STAT. ANN. 684.15(1) (West 1990):
'The tribunal may take into account its own experience and any
customs, usages of trade, or other facts and circumstances which it
deems relevant.'
Georgia: No provision. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-39 to -51 (1982 & Supp.
1999).
Hawaii: No provision. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 658D-2 to -9 (Michie
1995).
Maryland: No provision. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2B-01
to -09 (1995).
North Carolina: Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1567.58(d) (1999)).
Ohio: Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2712.55
(Banks-Baldwin 1994).
Oregon: Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See OR. REv. STAT. § 36.508(5)
(1998).

Texas: Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE §
172.251(e) (West 1998)).
Zimbabwe (1996)
Follows UNCITRAL Model Law. See Arbitration Act 1996, No. 6 of 1996, art.
28(4) (Zimb.) (similar text), reprintedin 4 HANDBOOK at Zimbabwe: Annex I-i1.
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Sources: The source for all the references, except when indicated otherwise, is
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, I-IV INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Pieter Sanders & Albert Jan van den Berg eds.,
1997); see also International Trade Law Branch, United Nations Office of Legal
Affairs, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),
Status of Conventions and Model Laws 14 (last updated Dec. 14, 1999)
<http://www.uncitral.org/english/status/status.pdf>
(identifying
legislation
based on UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration) (citing
Guatemala, Iran, Lithuania, and Oman in addition to those listed above).

